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SUMMARY 
 
Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 is known as ‗the unyielding rock‘ of English 
company law.  Nevertheless, the courts have at times deviated from Salomon. This 
dissertation examines three major ―veil-lifting‖ cases in order to assess Salomon‟s 
ongoing centrality (or otherwise). It also evaluates whether it is presently clear as to 
when the courts will or will not lift the veil.  
 
In DHN Food Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [1976] 1 WLR 
852, the veil was lifted on the ―single economic unit‖ ground. DHN was subsequently 
doubted, notably in Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433. More recent decisions 
may hint at a ―rehabilitation‖ of DHN, but this is currently unclear.  
 
In Re a Company [1985] BCLC 333, the veil was lifted on the grounds of ―justice‖. This 
proposition was emphatically rejected by the Court of Appeal in Adams. The 2006 Court 
of Appeal decision of Conway v Ratiu [2006] 1 All ER 571 restates the principle of Re a 
Company, but it cannot currently be seen as binding precedent for future judges to 
follow.  
 
The perplexing case of Creasey v Breachwood Motors Ltd [1992] BCC 638 triggered 
important debates which helped to clarify the ―sham‖ exception to the Salomon 
principle. However arguments for a ―Creasey extension‖ to the categories when the 
courts will deviate from Salomon have not been accepted.  
 
The dissertation concludes by suggesting that it is currently unclear as to when the 
courts will or will not disregard the Salomon principle. Proposals for reform made by 
academics are considered. It is still to be hoped, therefore, that either Parliament or the 
courts will issue clear guidance.  
 
The dissertation states the law as it was thought to be on 2 May 2012. The OSCOLA 
system of referencing is used throughout. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
„IN THE BEGINNING‟: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGACY OF SALOMON V 
SALOMON & CO LTD AND THE PRINCIPLE OF LIFTING THE VEIL 
 
 
1.1  Introduction 
As every law student should know, the case of Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd1 was 
famously described by Lord Templeman in 1989 as ‗the unyielding rock‘ of English 
company law.2 Others have described the case as ‗rightly... the key principle of 
company law,‘3 or have implicitly hailed it as ‗making possible the industrial and 
commercial developments which have occurred throughout the world.‘4 Others, 
however, have labelled the decision as ‗calamitous,‘5 and have raised concerns about 
its implications for a company‘s unsecured and tort creditors. 115 years after it was 
decided, Salomon continues to stimulate debate.  
 
Salomon, of course, sets out the foundational principles of separate personality and 
limited liability. A company is a separate legal entity, distinct from its members and 
directors, and its members have limited liability for its debts. There is therefore a 
metaphorical ‗veil of incorporation‘ or ‗corporate veil‘ between the company and its 
members and directors. Yet both Parliament and the courts have on occasion ‗lifted‘ or 
‗pierced‘ this veil. This study aims to analyse some key modern examples of the courts 
doing this, and to assess what they tell us about the ongoing centrality, or otherwise, of 
the Salomon principle. How far is Salomon still ‗the unyielding rock‘ in 2012? How close 
are we to being clear as to when the courts will or will not lift the veil?  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (HL) 
2
 Lord Templeman, ‗Company law lecture – forty years on‘ (1990) 11(1) Co Law 10. The lecture itself was 
delivered on 15 November 1989.   
3
 Lord Cooke of Thorndon, „ A Real Thing‟ in Turning Points of the Common Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 
1997) 8, 17 
4
 Ibid 11, quoting from LBC Gower, Principles of Company Law (5th edn 1992) 70  
5
 O Kahn-Freund, ‗Some Reflections on Company Law Reform‘ (1944) 7 MLR 54 
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1.2  Salomon – the facts 
Salomon was not the first case to rest on the principle of separate personality: this had 
been established, at the latest, in Foss v Harbottle.6 The principle of limited liability for 
shareholders, meanwhile, had been set out, and extended to private companies, in the 
Limited Liability Act 1855, the Joint Stock Companies Acts of 1844 and 1856, and the 
Companies Act 1862. Nevertheless, Salomon was the first case to examine the 
consequences of these doctrines in detail – in particular, their effects on unsecured 
creditors, and their application to what was effectively a ‗one-man company‘.  
 
A reminder of the facts of Salomon follows. Mr Salomon initially operated a business as 
a sole trader. He formed a limited company under the Companies Act 1862, ostensibly 
with the goal of ‗extend[ing] the business and mak[ing] provision for his family.‘7 The Act 
required a limited company to have seven shareholders. Therefore, he, his wife and 
their five children took one share each. He then transferred his business to the company 
in exchange for a further 20,000 shares issued to him personally, together with some 
cash and a debenture. The company was effectively controlled by Mr Salomon alone. 
When the newly-formed company hit difficulties, Mr Salomon mortgaged the debenture 
to Mr Broderip. Soon afterwards, the company defaulted on payments to Mr Broderip, 
who enforced his security. The company was put into liquidation. There were insufficient 
assets to pay off Mr Broderip, who brought an action, challenging the validity of the 
arrangements leading to the company‘s formation, and seeking to make Mr Salomon 
personally liable for the company‘s debts.  
 
At first instance, Vaughan Williams J held the company to be the ‗mere nominee‘8 of Mr 
Salomon, and that Mr Salomon must indemnify the company against its outstanding 
debts. Mr Salomon appealed, first to the Court of Appeal and then to the House of 
Lords. By the time judgment was given in the Court of Appeal, sufficient funds had in 
fact been realised in the liquidation to pay off Mr Broderip in full, with about £1,000 
remaining. Mr Salomon, now holding the debenture unencumbered, claimed the 
                                                          
6
 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 67 ER 189 
7
 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22, 48 (MacNaghten LJ) 
8
 Broderip v Salomon [1895] 2 Ch 323 (CA), 329  
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remaining £1,000 ahead of the unsecured creditors.9 At the point the claim reached the 
House of Lords, the liquidator, acting on behalf of the creditors in general, took over the 
litigation from Broderip.  
 
1.3  Salomon – the judgments  
A brief survey of some of the key passages in the judgments in the higher courts is 
instructive, as they illustrate some issues which remain contentious, and which will 
inform much of this study.  
 
1.3.1 The Court of Appeal 
The Court of Appeal rejected Mr Salomon‘s appeal, taking a dim view of Mr Salomon‘s 
motives in using his family members as ‗mere dummies‘ to enable him to obtain the 
benefits of limited liability. As Lindley LJ put it:  
The object of the whole arrangement is to do the very thing which the legislature 
intended not to be done… Mr Aron Salomon's scheme is a device to defraud 
creditors… the formation of the company, the agreement of August 1892, and the 
issue of debentures to the appellant pursuant to such agreement, were a mere 
scheme to enable him to carry on business in the name of the company with 
limited liability contrary to the true intent and meaning of the Companies Act 
1862, and further to enable him to obtain a preference over other creditors of the 
company by procuring a first charge on the assets of the company by means of 
such debentures.10 
 
Similarly, according to Lopes LJ,  
It would be lamentable if a scheme like this could not be defeated. If we were to 
permit it to succeed, we should be authorizing a perversion of the Joint Stock 
Companies Acts. We should be giving vitality to that which is a myth and a 
fiction. The transaction is a device to apply the machinery of the Joint Stock 
Companies Act to a state of things never contemplated by that Act…. It never 
was intended that the company to be constituted should consist of one 
substantial person and six mere dummies, the nominees of that person, without 
any real interest in the company. The Act contemplated the incorporation of 
seven independent bona fide members, who had a mind and a will of their own, 
and were not the mere puppets of an individual who, adopting the machinery of 
the Act, carried on his old business in the same way as before, when he was a 
sole trader. To legalize such a transaction would be a scandal.11  
                                                          
9
 Broderip v Salomon [1895] 2 Ch 323 (CA), 345 
10
 Broderip v Salomon [1895] 2 Ch 323 (CA), 337-340 
11
 Broderip v Salomon [1895] 2 Ch 323 (CA), 340-341 
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1.3.2 The House of Lords 
Conversely, the House of Lords found that Mr Salomon‘s motives were irrelevant, and 
concentrated on the actual wording of the Companies Act 1862. This approach was 
typified by Lord Halsbury:  
I am simply here dealing with the provisions of the statute, and it seems to me to 
be essential to the artificial creation that the law should recognise only that artificial 
existence - quite apart from the motives or conduct of individual corporators... it 
seems to me impossible to dispute that once the company is legally incorporated it 
must be treated like any other independent person with its rights and liabilities 
appropriate to itself, and that the motives of those who took part in the promotion 
of the company are absolutely irrelevant in discussing what those rights and 
liabilities are.12 
 
Lord Watson was 
unable to comprehend how a company, which [had] been formed contrary to the 
true intent and meaning of a statute, and (in the language of Lindley L.J.) [did] the 
very thing which the Legislature intended not to be done, [could] yet be held to 
have been legally incorporated in terms of the statute.13 
 
Lord Herschell, commenting on the decision of the Court of Appeal, said 
The Court of Appeal has declared that the formation of the respondent company 
and the agreement to take over the business of the appellant were a scheme 
‗contrary to the true intent and meaning of the Companies Act.‘ I know of no 
means of ascertaining what is the intent and meaning of the Companies Act 
except by examining its provisions and finding what regulations it has imposed as 
a condition of trading with limited liability... If, then, in the present case all the 
requirements of the statute were complied with, and a company was effectually 
constituted, and this is the hypothesis of the judgment appealed from, what 
warrant is there for saying that what was done was contrary to the true intent and 
meaning of the Companies Act?14 
 
Lord MacNaghten, taking the requirements of the Act to their logical conclusions, 
famously remarked that  
The company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to the 
memorandum; and, though it may be that after incorporation the business is 
precisely the same as it was before, and the same persons are managers, and the 
same hands receive the profits, the company is not in law the agent of the 
                                                          
12
 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (HL), 30 
13
 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (HL), 38 
14
 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (HL), 45-46 
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subscribers or trustee for them. Nor are the subscribers as members liable, in any 
shape or form, except to the extent and in the manner provided by the Act.15 
 
Lord Davey, whilst apparently more reluctant, nevertheless took the same literalist 
approach: 
My Lords, it is possible, and (I think) probable, that the conclusion to which I feel 
constrained to come in this case may not have been contemplated by the 
Legislature, and may be due to some defect in the machinery of the Act. But, after 
all, the intention of the Legislature must be collected from the language of its 
enactments…16 
 
Consequently, the House of Lords famously reversed the decision of the Court of 
Appeal, holding that Mr Salomon should hold no further liability to the company‘s 
creditors. For Lord MacNaghten, the unsecured creditors affected by this decision had 
‗only themselves to blame for their misfortunes.‘17 
 
The contrast with the approach of the Court of Appeal is clear. The Court of Appeal 
assessed the morality of Mr Salomon‘s arrangements, and was evidently uncomfortable 
with him using the machinery of the Companies Act to limit his liability. Dignam and 
Lowry note that, if the courts had at that time been able to look at Hansard to establish 
Parliament‘s intentions,18 the Court of Appeal would have been vindicated, since the 
requirement for seven members had been chosen to prevent very small businesses 
incorporating.19 The House of Lords, however, simply looked at whether Mr Salomon 
had complied with the Act‘s formal requirements. Since, on its findings, he had done so, 
he was therefore entitled to the benefit of limited liability. This ‗battle‘ between form and 
substance has arguably informed the debate about Salomon, and when it is appropriate 
for statute or the court to deviate from it, ever since. If the legal requirements for 
company formation have been complied with, is there any warrant for the court to ‗look 
behind‘ the veil of incorporation? Or are wider moral and commercial factors relevant?  
 
 
                                                          
15
 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (HL), 51 
16
 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (HL), 54 
17
 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (HL), 53 
18
 The courts were of course unable to do so until the decision in Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593 
19
 Alan Dignam & John Lowry, Company Law (6th edn, OUP 2010) 22 
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1.4 Salomon – reception and legacy: criticisms  
Given the influence which the Salomon decision has subsequently enjoyed, it is 
perhaps surprising that it has occasionally been subject to trenchant criticism. Joseph 
Marryat MP pre-emptively warned of its implications for creditors as early as 1810: ‗If a 
company should at any time become insolvent, the individual members would still 
remain in affluence and be driven in their coaches by the persons ruined.‘20 When the 
judgment was handed down on 16 November 1896, Sir Frederick Pollock remarked that 
such a decision could not have been given 30 or even 20 years previously.21 In 1944, 
Otto Kahn-Freund memorably described the decision as ‗calamitous‘,22 owing to its 
impact on unsecured creditors, and suggested that Parliament might abrogate Salomon 
by legislation,23 or even abolish private companies altogether!24 Alternatively, he 
suggested that controlling shareholders should be liable for a company‘s debts, or that 
company formation should be made harder and costlier, thereby reducing the number of 
small companies in particular.25 More recently, Gary Scanlan has echoed Kahn-
Freund‘s concerns, arguing that ‗the law needs to go further in providing a means of 
protection for the unsecured creditor of private limited companies‘.26 Scanlan questions 
whether the controllers of private limited companies should automatically enjoy limited 
liability. He suggests that private companies should not be allowed to operate without a 
minimum issued and paid-up share capital, and that if the company‘s capital falls below 
this level, the company should be required to stop trading, or its controllers should face 
unlimited personal liability.27  
 
Other commentators have focussed on the implications of Salomon for a company‘s tort 
or ‗involuntary‘28 creditors. As Ewan McGaughey argues, ‗[i]t is highly doubtful that the 
principle in Salomon should ever have been thought to have extended to torts. Lord 
                                                          
20
 Quoted in Ben Pettet, ‗Limited Liability – A Principle for the 21st Century?‘ [1995] CLP 124, 146 
21
 Lord Cooke of Thorndon (n 3) 8 
22
 O. Kahn-Freund, ‗Some Reflections on Company Law Reform‘ (1944) 7 MLR 54 
23
 ibid, 57 
24
 ibid, 59 
25
 ibid, 57 
26
 Gary Scanlan, ‗The Salomon principle‘ (2004) 25(7) Co Law 196 
27
 ibid, 196 
28
 Ben Pettet, ‗Limited Liability – A Principle for the 21st Century?‘ [1995] CLP 124, 152 
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Macnaghten did not have this in mind, because he said Salomon's unsecured creditors 
―only had themselves to blame‖. Tort claimants do not have themselves to blame.‘29  
McGaughey argues that controlling shareholders should therefore be liable for a 
company‘s tortious debts.30 Jonathan Crowe similarly argues that if the company‘s own 
resources are exhausted, liability for corporate torts should fall firstly on holding 
companies and controlling shareholders, and then on ordinary investors on a pro rata 
basis.31 Clearly, such proposals represent significant departures from Salomon.  
 
1.5 Salomon – reception and legacy: affirmation  
Mainstream opinion has nevertheless affirmed Salomon as encouraging enterprise. 
Pettet, though sharing the concerns of Crowe and McGaughey for tort creditors, argued 
against the abolition of limited liability for tort debts on the grounds that this would 
discourage enterprise.32 Gower hailed the limited liability company – and, by implication, 
the Salomon decision – as ‗Unquestionably... a major instrument in making possible the 
industrial and commercial developments which have occurred throughout the world.‘33 
Lord Cooke noted Salomon‘s ‗global consequences‘34 and enthused that ‗[a]fter a 
century the principle of Salomon has and should have a vigour... undiminished... It 
rightly remains the key principle of company law.‘35  Lowry and Reisberg, whilst 
recognising the negative implications of Salomon for unsecured and tort creditors, 
nevertheless affirm that ‗the arguments in favour of limited liability for contract debts 
have won the day. Limited liability for contract debt is here to stay and there is no great 
movement for its abolition.‘36  
 
                                                          
29
 Ewan McGaughey, ‗Donoguhe v Salomon in the High Court‘ (2011) 4 JPI Law 249, 253 
30
 ibid, 258 
31
 Jonathan Crowe, ‗Does Control Make a Difference? The Moral Foundations of Shareholder Liability for 
Corporate Wrongs‘ (2012) 75 (2) MLR 159 
32
 Pettet (n 28) 157. Pettet argued instead that companies should be compelled to purchase additional 
insurance to cover the scenario where tort claims exceeded the companies‘ available assets. 
33
 Lord Cooke of Thorndon (n 3) 11, quoting from LBC Gower, Principles of Company Law (5th edn 1992) 
70 
34
 ibid 11 
35
 ibid 17 
36
 John Lowry & Arad Reisberg, Pettet‟s Company Law: Company and Capital Markets Law (3rd edn, 
Pearson Longman 2009) 40 
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The courts, meanwhile, affirmed Salomon most clearly in Lee v Lee‟s Air Farming Ltd37 
and Macaura v Northern Assurance Co.38 In Lee, a controlling shareholder who was 
also the company‘s chief executive was nevertheless held to be a ‗worker‘ for the 
purposes of New Zealand employment legislation, on the grounds that he and the 
company were separate and distinct legal persons. For Lord Morris, it was ‗a logical 
consequence of the decision in Salomon's case that one person [could] function in dual 
capacities‘39… ‗[A]n application of the principles of Salomon's case demonstrate[d] that 
the company was distinct from [the controlling shareholder].‘40 In Macaura, the 
company‘s property was insured by policies in the name of Mr Macuara, the sole 
shareholder. When the property was destroyed by fire, Mr Macaura was unable to claim 
insurance as he himself had no insurable interest in the company‘s property. Although 
Salomon was not specifically mentioned in the House of Lords, Lord Wrenbury took the 
Salomon principle to its logical conclusion: ‗the corporator, even if he holds all the 
shares is not the corporation, and… neither he nor any creditor of the company has any 
property, legal or equitable, in the assets of the corporation.‘41 
 
1.6 Departing from the Salomon principle: lifting the veil  
Given the contrasting approaches taken in the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, 
and given the contrasting reactions to Salomon, it was perhaps inevitable that situations 
would arise where the ‗veil of incorporation‘ between the company and its members 
would be lifted. The phrase ‗lifting the veil‘ refers to those situations where Parliament or 
the courts, departing from Salomon, have decided not to maintain the separateness of 
the company from its members, or (by extension) of parent companies from their 
subsidiaries, or of companies within the same group from each other. The veil has been 
lifted for various reasons, though neither Parliament nor the courts have ever drawn up 
a definitive list of such situations. Whilst veil-lifting has on occasions been beneficial to 
(some of) those affected, it has also had the effect of creating uncertainty: will the 
separateness of the company be upheld or disregarded in any given situation?  
                                                          
37
 [1961] AC 12, PC 
38
 [1925] AC 619 
39
 [1961] AC 12, 26 
40
 [1961] AC 12, 30 
41
 [1925] AC 619, 633 
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1.7 Aims and scope of the study 
This study aims to assess how far Lord Templeman‘s 1989 statement remains true in 
2012. Can one still accurately label Salomon as ‗the unyielding rock‘ of English 
company law? Or have the situations where the veil is lifted now proliferated to such an 
extent that this statement is now inaccurate? How close are we to certainty as to when 
the veil will or will not be lifted?  
 
Chapter 2 briefly surveys the generally conservative judicial approach to veil-lifting prior 
to 1966.42 Chapters 3 to 5 analyse, respectively, three veil-lifting cases which, in their 
time, marked significant departures from the Salomon principle: DHN Food Distributors 
Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council;43 Re a Company;44 and Creasey v 
Breachwood Motors Ltd.45 Each of these three chapters includes a review of the 
(claimed) precedents for each case; critical analysis of the respective judgments; a 
survey of subsequent judicial and academic treatment; and an assessment of how each 
case informs the debate about Salomon and lifting the veil.  Finally, chapter 6 offers 
some concluding thoughts, including consideration of some proposals for reform.  
 
1.8  A word about terminology 
Some writers, such as Ottolenghi, have divided veil-lifting situations into narrower 
categories, such as ‗peeping behind‘, ‗penetrating‘, ‗extending‘ and ‗ignoring‘ the veil.46 
For the purposes of this study, all instances of Parliament or the judiciary disregarding 
the separate personality of the company will be referred to as ‗lifting‘ or ‗piercing‘ the veil 
– expressions which will be used interchangeably.   
                                                          
42
 The rationale for choosing this date is explained in chapter 2.2. 
43
 [1976] 1 WLR 852 
44
 [1985] BCLC 333 
45
 [1992] BCC 638 
46
 S Ottolenghi, ‗From Peeping Behind the Corporate Veil, to Ignoring it Completely‘ [1990] MLR 338  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE BACKDROP: VEIL-LIFTING BY THE COURTS, 1897-1966 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In chapter 1, we reviewed the facts and outcome of the Salomon decision, and 
considered how the case has been received – both negatively and positively. We 
considered how it was affirmed by the courts in Lee v Lee‟s Air Farming Ltd and in 
Macaura v Northern Assurance Co. We also introduced the idea of Parliament or the 
courts departing from the Salomon principle, and explained what is meant by ‗lifting‘ or 
‗piercing the veil‘.  
 
Parliament has departed from the Salomon principle by enacting various statutes which 
lift the veil between companies within the same group, or between a company and its 
members or directors. Such statutes cover areas such as taxation, accounting, 
employment and insolvency.1 The last of these warrants brief comment. Sections 213 
and 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 impose personal liability upon the directors of 
companies in insolvent liquidation for fraudulent and wrongful trading respectively. 
Sections 216 and 217 of the same Act impose personal liability in situations involving 
what is known as ―phoenix trading.‖ Technically, these sections impose liability on 
directors (or, in the case of s. 213, anyone else knowingly party to carrying on the 
business with intent to defraud the company‘s creditors), and therefore do not violate 
the principle of limited liability for shareholders. In practice, however, they are most 
often applied in situations involving private limited companies, where the directors are 
also the major shareholders, and therefore effectively remove the benefit of limited 
liability in insolvency situations.2 They therefore represent – albeit indirectly - perhaps 
the most significant statutory inroad into the Salomon principle. Such statutory 
examples will not be examined further in this study, which focuses instead on judicial 
veil-lifting.  
 
                                                          
1
 A non-exhaustive list is set out in Alan Dignam & John Lowry, Company Law (6th edn, OUP 2010) 32-34 
2
 See, for example, Re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd (No 2) [1989] BCLC 513 (ChD) 
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In this chapter, we will outline some of the key cases in which the courts lifted the veil 
between 1897 and 1966. The courts generally adhered to the Salomon principle during 
this period, and departed from it only in exceptional circumstances. It is against this 
conservative backdrop that more recent developments must be considered.  
 
2.2 Veil-lifting by the courts, 1897-1966 
Dignam and Lowry divide the history of judicial veil-lifting into three periods.3 They see 
the period from 1897 to 1966 as one in which Salomon dominated and during which 
judicial veil-lifting was rare and exceptional. They ascribe this to the fact that the House 
of Lords could not overrule itself during this period. This changed in 1966, triggering a 
more interventionist period, with Lord Denning leading ‗a crusade to encourage veil-
lifting‘.4 (Hicks and Goo also see the rise and fall of Lord Denning‘s influence as 
important markers.5) This in turn was followed by a more restrictive approach from 1989 
onwards, following the Court of Appeal‘s decision in Adams v Cape Industries plc,6 
which is considered in more detail in chapters 3.9 and 5.1. A survey of some of the key 
examples of judicial veil-lifting prior to 1966 follows. 
 
2.2.1 Enemy character  
During World War One, Daimler Co Ltd v Continental Tyre & Rubber Co (Great Britain) 
Ltd7 considered whether to impute an English-registered company whose controlling 
shareholders were German with ‗enemy character‘.  On a strict application of Salomon – 
as the Court of Appeal ruled – the shareholders‘ nationality was irrelevant.8 The House 
of Lords, however, lifted the veil and ruled that the company was indeed ‗enemy‘ in 
nature. This decision owed much to wartime exigency and was clearly exceptional.  
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 Dignam & Lowry (n 1) 35-43 
4
 Dignam & Lowry (n 1) 36 
5
 Andrew Hicks & SH Goo, Cases & Materials on Company Law (6th edn, OUP, 2008) 107-110 
6
 [1990] Ch 433 (CA) 
7
 Daimler Co Ltd v Continental Tyre & Rubber Co (Great Britain) Ltd  [1916] 2 AC 307) (HL) 
8
 Daimler Co Ltd v Continental Tyre & Rubber Co (Great Britain) Ltd [1915] 1 K.B. 893 (CA) 
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2.2.2  Agency 
In Smith Stone & Knight Ltd v Birmingham Corporation,9 a company set up a subsidiary 
company to operate a business. The parent company retained ownership of the 
business itself, and of the business premises. The parent company held all the shares 
in subsidiary except for five, which were held by its nominees. The profits of the new 
company were treated as profits of the parent company. The parent company appointed 
the persons who conducted the business. The subsidiary kept no books of its own, and 
its profits were treated as the parent‘s profits. Effectively, therefore, the subsidiary had 
no real independent existence. The local authority compulsorily acquired the business 
premises. The parent company claimed compensation in respect of removal and 
disturbance. The local authority resisted this claim, contending that the proper claimants 
were the subsidiary company – which was a separate legal entity. On a strict application 
of Salomon, this was correct. The court, however, disregarded the separate personality 
of the parent and the subsidiary. It held that the subsidiary company was operating as 
an agent on behalf of its parent, and therefore the parent company was entitled to claim 
compensation. Again, this decision was based on very unusual facts.10 A similar 
approach was however taken in Re FG Films Ltd.11 In that case, the court lifted the veil 
to find that an English company was the agent of its American parent company, and 
therefore not the ‗maker‘ of a film for the purposes of British film legislation.  
 
In Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. Ltd v Llewellin,12 an English company was wholly 
owned by an American parent company. The English company‘s business was to make 
tyres and sell them to distributors based in Europe. The parent company drew up 
contracts with the distributors and the English company. If it could be established that 
the business was not carried on in the United Kingdom, these arrangements would not 
be subject to United Kingdom tax. The House of Lords ruled, however, that the English 
company was operating the business of the American company in the United Kingdom 
                                                          
9
 [1939] 4 All ER 116 (KBD) 
10
 In JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade & Industry [1989] Ch 72 (CA) at 190, Kerr LJ 
said that the facts of Smith Stone & Knight were so unusual that ‗no conclusion of principle [could] be 
derived from that case.‘ 
11
 [1953] 1 WLR 483 (ChD)  
12
 [1957] 1 WLR 464 (HL) 
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as its agent, and therefore any profits made on the contracts were subject to the United 
Kingdom tax regime. In so finding, the court deviated from the Salomon principle that a 
company and its shareholder(s) (in this case, the parent company) are separate entities. 
 
2.2.3 ―Sham”, “façade” or “fraud”: 
As we shall see in chapter 5, this category of exceptions to the Salomon principle 
remains the most potent, and will therefore be examined more extensively. The terms 
―sham‖ and ―fraud‖ will be used interchangeably throughout the study. 
 
In Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne,13 Horne was employed by the claimant. He covenanted 
that, if he resigned, he would not solicit Gilford‘s customers. However, he left Gilford, 
and, having taken legal advice, set up a business which he operated through the means 
of a limited company which he controlled. The company solicited Gilford‘s customers. 
On a strict application of Salomon, Horne had not breached his covenant to Gilford 
since he and the new company were separate entities. Nevertheless, Gilford 
successfully sued for breach of covenant and an injunction was awarded against both 
Horne and the new company. In the classic words of Lord Hanworth MR:  
 
[T]his company was formed as a device, a stratagem, in order to mask the 
effective carrying on of a business of Mr EB Horne. The purpose of it was to try to 
enable him, under what is a cloak or a sham, to engage in business which, on 
contemplation of the agreement which had been sent to him just about seven days 
before the company was incorporated, was a business in respect of which he had 
a fear that the plaintiffs might intervene and object.14 
 
In Jones v Lipman,15 Lipman had agreed to sell land to Jones. Before completion, 
however, he transferred and sold the land to a company which he had formed, and of 
which he and a clerk of his solicitors were sole directors and shareholders. He argued 
that he could not honour the agreement with Jones and transfer the land, because he 
no longer had title to it. Russell J however held that the company was ‗the creature of 
[Lipman], a device and a sham, a mask which he [was holding] before his face in an 
                                                          
13
 [1933] Ch 935 (CA) 
14
 [1933] Ch 935 (CA) 956 
15
 [1962] 1 WLR 832 (ChD) 
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attempt to avoid recognition by the eye of equity.‘16 He ordered specific performance 
against both Lipman and the company.  
 
Although both Gilford and Jones remain classic cases illustrating the ―sham‖ or ―fraud‖ 
exception to the Salomon principle, neither case explicitly mentioned Salomon. As Marc 
Moore astutely points out, the court‘s reasoning in Gilford was based on the case of 
Smith v Hancock17 – a case about a sole trader which preceded Salomon by three 
years! On this basis, Moore argues that the ―sham‖ exception is ‗the product of a 
piecemeal and doctrinally tenuous process of judicial reasoning.‘18 We will return to his 
arguments in chapter 6.  
 
2.3 Commentary  
Two issues from this brief survey bear highlighting. The first is that there were no clear 
guidelines as to when the courts would, or would not, lift the veil. For instance, in 
Macaura v Northern Assurance Co (considered in chapter 1.5), the court declined to lift 
the veil between the company and its sole shareholder. In similar situations in Gilford 
and Jones, however, the courts did lift the veil. In 1944, Kahn-Freund had complained 
that ‗in many cases it [was] a matter of guesswork whether the Court [would] allow the 
parties to ‗draw the veil‘ or force them to lift it.‘19 In 1960, Wedderburn called for 
Parliament to formulate a non-exhaustive statutory list of circumstances in which the 
court might lift the veil, for example where a company was undercapitalised, or where it 
was being used to evade legal obligations.20 Twenty-four years later, following the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Multinational Gas and Petroleum Co v Multinational 
Gas & Petrochemical Services Ltd,21 Lord Wedderburn (as he had then become) would 
still be calling for reform.22 
                                                          
16
 [1962] 1 WLR 832, 836 
17
 [1894]  Ch 377 (CA)  
18
 Marc Moore, ‗‗A temple built on faulty foundations‘: piercing the corporate veil and the legacy of 
Salomon v Salomon‘ [2006] JBL 180, 196 
19
 O Kahn-Freund, ‗Some Reflections on Company Law Reform‘ (1944) 7 MLR 54, 56 
20
 KW Wedderburn, ‗A Corporations Ombudsman?‘ (1960) 23 MLR 663, 664 
21
 [1983] Ch 258 (CA)  
22
 KW Wedderburn, ‗Multinationals and the Antiquities of Company Law‘ (1984) 47 MLR 87, 90-92. This is 
considered further in chapter 3.8.1. 
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Secondly, when the courts did lift the veil, they did so only in exceptional circumstances. 
The decisions above were all made in cases with unusual sets of facts. Elsewhere, the 
courts took a conservative approach. This is perhaps best illustrated by the case of 
Tunstall v Steigman.23 In Tunstall, a tenant was granted a lease of business premises. 
The landlady then formed a company in order to operate her own business. She held all 
the shares in the company except for two, which were held by nominees. She was also 
effectively the sole director. She later resisted the tenant‘s application for a renewal of 
the lease, arguing that she needed the premises for her own business. The court, 
applying Salomon strictly, declined to lift the veil. It was held that she did not intend to 
occupy the premises in order to operate her own business, but for the purposes of a 
business operated by the company. Therefore, she was not entitled to resist the 
tenant‘s application for renewal.  
 
This conservative approach is clear from the respective judgments. For Ormerod LJ, 
‗any departure [from the Salomon principle laid down in Salomon] [dealt] with special 
circumstances when a limited company might well be a facade concealing the real 
facts.‘24 Willmer LJ remarked that,  
 
There is no escape from the fact that a company is a legal entity entirely separate 
from its corporators - see Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Here the landlord and her 
company are entirely separate entities. This is no matter of form; it is a matter of 
substance and reality... Even the holder of 100 per cent. of the shares in a 
company does not by such holding become so identified with the company that he 
or she can be said to carry on the business of the company.25 
 
Finally, in language echoing that of Lord MacNaghten in Salomon itself, Danckwerts LJ 
stated that  
 
the personality of those in control of the company was only to be regarded as 
material in special circumstances, such as a state of war, and only as indicating 
the nature of the company without really departing from the principle that a limited 
company incorporated under the Companies Acts is a distinct legal entity, differing 
from the individuals who hold the shares in the company or control it.26 
                                                          
23
 [1962] 2 QB 593 (CA) 
24
 [1962] 2 QB 593 (CA) 602 
25
 [1962] 2 QB 593 (CA) 605 
26
 [1962] 2 QB 593 (CA) 607 
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2.4 Conclusions 
In 1966, it would have been easy to assess whether or not Salomon was ‗the unyielding 
rock‘. The judgments in Tunstall v Steigmann are instructive. The court would only 
depart from Salomon and lift the veil in ‗special circumstances‘, such as where a 
company was ‗a façade concealing the real facts‘ or in ‗a state of war‘ (or, one might 
add, in extremely narrow circumstances where a company was an agent of its 
corporator, or, more cynically, where the interests of the Revenue were threatened). Yet 
a decade later, following the decision in DHN Food Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets 
London Borough Council (‗‘DHN‟‟),27 some would claim that Salomon‟s ‗centrality in 
company law theory‘ had been ‗put into question.‘28 DHN, and the subsequent debate 
about the ―single economic unit‖ argument, are considered in chapter 3.  
 
  
                                                          
27
 [1976] 1 WLR 852 (CA) 
28
 D Sugarman & F Webb, ‗Three-in-One: Trusts, Licences and Veils‘ (1977) 93 LQR 170, 175  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
DHN FOOD DISTRIBUTORS LTD V TOWER HAMLETS LONDON BOROUGH 
COUNCIL : A FROLIC OF DENNING‟S OWN, OR A GUIDING PRINCIPLE FOR 
TODAY?  
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, we examine the 1976 Court of Appeal case of DHN Food Distributors 
Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council1 (―DHN‖) which, for a time, appeared to 
extend the boundaries of judicial veil-lifting – at least in relation to corporate groups. 
Shortly after DHN was heard, David Hayton described it as a ‗very sensible‘ decision in 
which the court had ‗looked at the business realities of the situation rather than 
confining itself to a narrow legalistic view.‘2 Sugarman and Webb, meanwhile, claimed 
that the decision ‗undermine[d] the rigid rule of Salomon‟s case‘ - indeed, that it ‗put into 
question [Salomon‟s] centrality in company law theory.‘3 Ten years later, however, 
Graham Rixon labelled the decision as ‗an aberration,‘4 and fourteen years later, 
following the landmark case of Adams v Cape Industries plc5 (―Adams”), there appeared 
to be ‗little [remaining] scope‘6 to rely on the arguments used in DHN.  
 
We will first examine the (claimed) judicial antecedents to DHN, and then the facts and 
judgments of the case itself, before making some initial comments. We will review the 
positive early academic and judicial reaction to the decision. We will then consider the 
doubt cast upon DHN by subsequent rulings, notably those in Woolfson v Strathclyde 
Regional Council7 and in Adams, where DHN was cited as an example of veil-lifting on 
the basis of the ―single economic unit‖ argument. We will also consider whether some 
more recent Court of Appeal and first instance decisions point towards a ―revival‖ of that 
argument. Finally, we will summarise how DHN and subsequent cases fit in with the 
                                                          
1
 [1976] 1 WLR 852 (CA) 
2
 D Hayton, ‗Contractual licences and corporate veils‘ [1977] CLJ 12, 13  
3
 D Sugarman, & F Webb, ‗Three-in-One: Trusts, Licences and Veils‘ (1977) 93 LQR 170, 175  
4
 FG Rixon, ‗Lifting the veil between holding and subsidiary companies‘ (1986) 102 LQR 415, 422 
5
 [1990] Ch 433 (CA) 
6
 David Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (OUP 2009) 69 
7
 [1978] SC  90 (HL) 
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Salomon principle, and what they tell us about when the courts deviate from it – 
particularly in the context of corporate groups. 
 
3.2 Background  
In chapter 2, we saw that the courts took a conservative approach to veil-lifting up until 
1966, as typified by Tunstall v Steigmann. In a handful of cases in the 1950s and 1960s, 
however, the courts relaxed this approach in relation to corporate groups. Three such 
cases are explained below; their relevance to DHN will become apparent later.  
 
3.2.1 Harold Holdsworth & Co (Wakefield) Ltd v Caddies8 
Mr Caddies had a service contract with a parent company. The parent company, 
however, restricted his duties to the management of a subsidiary company. Caddies 
sued for breach of contract, arguing that he could not be employed by the subsidiary, 
since his contract was with the parent – a strict application of Salomon. The House of 
Lords rejected his claim, holding that the service contract allowed the employer parent 
company to assign Caddies duties within the group. Since the subsidiaries were 
controlled by the parent, the court viewed them as divisions of the parent. Lord Reid‘s 
remarks are pertinent: 
 
It was argued that the subsidiary companies were separate legal entities each 
under the control of its own board of directors, that in law the board of the 
appellant company could not assign any duties to anyone in relation to the 
management of the subsidiary companies and that therefore the agreement 
cannot be construed as entitling them to assign any such duties to the respondent. 
 
My Lords, in my judgment this is too technical an argument. This is an agreement 
in re mercatoria and it must be construed in light of the facts and realities of the 
situation. The appellant company owned the whole share capital of British Textile 
Manufacturing Co. Ltd. and under the agreement of 1947 the directors of this 
company were to be the nominees of the appellants. So, in fact, the appellants 
could control the internal management of their subsidiary companies, and, in the 
unlikely event of there being any difficulty, it was only necessary to go through 
formal procedure in order to make the decision of the appellants' board fully 
effective. 9  
                                                          
8
 [1955] 1 WLR 352 (HL) 
9
 [1955] 1 WLR 352, 367 
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3.2.2 Scottish Co-Operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer10  
 
Mr Meyer was a minority shareholder of the Scottish Textile and Manufacturing Co Ltd 
(―Textile‖). The majority of the shares were held by the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale 
Society Ltd (―Wholesale‖), which also appointed a majority of Textile‘s directors. When 
Textile‘s business declined, Meyer alleged that Wholesale had mismanaged Textile‘s 
business, and claimed he had suffered ―oppression‖ under s. 210 Companies Act 1948 
(now abolished). He sought an order that Wholesale should purchase his shares in 
Textile. For his claim to succeed, Textile‘s corporate veil had to be pierced, ‗so that the 
oppressive conduct of [Wholesale] could also be interpreted as oppressive conduct in 
relation to [Textile], that is, the holding company and subsidiary had to be merged into 
one single economic entity.‘11 Meyer‘s claim was upheld by the House of Lords. 
Viscount Simonds said,  
 
I do not think that my own views could be stated better than in the late Lord 
President Cooper's words on the first hearing in this case. ‗In my view,‘ he said, 
‗the section warrants the court in looking at the business realities of a situation and 
does not confine them to a narrow legalistic view.‘12 
 
As in Harold Holdsworth, the court focused on the ‗business realities‘ of the group 
situation, rather than the ‗narrow legalistic view‘ that the parent and subsidiary were 
separate entities.  
 
3.2.3 Littlewoods Mail Order Stores Ltd v McGregor13 
Littlewoods Mail Order Stores Ltd (―Littlewoods‖) rented its premises from a commercial 
landlord. The landlord assigned the freehold in the property to a subsidiary of 
Littlewoods, which resulted in Littlewoods effectively paying rent to its own subsidiary. 
Littlewoods claimed tax relief on these payments; the Inland Revenue objected. The 
court rejected Littlewoods‘ claim, holding that the freehold effectively belonged to 
Littlewoods itself. Lord Denning‘s comment indicates the clear deviation from Salomon:  
                                                          
10
 [1959] AC 324 (HL) 
11
 Stephen Griffin, Company Law: Fundamental Principles (4th edn, Pearson 2006) 17-18 
12
 [1959] AC 324, 343 
13
 [1969] 3 All ER 855 (CA) 
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The doctrine laid down in Salomon v. Salomon & Co. [1897] A.C. 22, has to be 
watched very carefully. It has often been supposed to cast a veil over the 
personality of a limited company through which the courts cannot see. But that is 
not true. The courts can and often do draw aside the veil. They can, and often do, 
pull off the mask. They look to see what really lies behind. The legislature has 
shown the way with group accounts and the rest. And the courts should follow 
suit.14 
  
These three cases (ostensibly) set the scene for DHN.  
  
3.3 DHN: the facts  
DHN Food Distributors Ltd (―DHN‖), Bronze Investment Ltd (―Bronze‖) and DHN Food 
Transport Ltd (―Transport‖) constituted a group of three companies associated in a 
grocery business. DHN, the parent company, owned all the shares in the other two. 
The directors of all three companies were identical. Bronze and Transport had no 
independent operations. Bronze‘s only asset was the freehold in the premises from 
which DHN operated the business. Importantly, DHN occupied the premises as a 
licensee, not as a tenant, and therefore held no interest in the land. Transport‘s only 
assets were the vehicles used in the business.  
In 1969, the local council acquired the premises by compulsory purchase. Bronze, as 
the legal owner of the premises, received compensation for the value of the land 
pursuant to the Land Compensation Act 1961. However, no suitable alternative 
premises could be found and therefore the business ceased.  
DHN and Transport applied to the Lands Tribunal for a ruling that they too were 
entitled to compensation for the disturbance of the business.15 For this claim to 
succeed, they had to demonstrate that they (as opposed to Bronze) held an interest in 
the land. This would involve lifting the veil since, on a strict application of Salomon, 
Bronze‘s interest in the land in no way belonged to DHN, even though DHN owned all 
of the shares in Bronze. Interestingly, counsel for the companies argued that Bronze 
held the land as an agent for DHN, and therefore the veil should be lifted as in Smith, 
                                                          
14
 [1969] 3 All ER 855, 860 
15
 DHN Food Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council (1975) 30 P & CR 251 (Lands 
Tribunal) 
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Stone & Knight Ltd v Birmingham Corporation. The tribunal rejected this argument, 
stating that the mere fact that the parent completely controlled the subsidiary did not 
constitute an ―agency‖ relationship.16 Indeed, the tribunal found that Bronze had been 
intentionally operated as a separate company in order to gain certain tax advantages. 
The tribunal therefore ruled that DHN held no interest in the land and was therefore 
not entitled to compensation for disturbance of the business.  
The three companies appealed to the Court of Appeal.  
 
3.4 DHN: the judgments 
In the Court of Appeal, Lord Denning, Goff LJ and Shaw LJ all agreed that the veil 
between the companies should be lifted so that DHN and Transport could claim 
compensation for disturbance of the business. We need of course only consider those 
parts of their judgments which deal with the corporate veil argument. For ease of 
future reference, quotations from the judgments are indented and numbered. 
 
3.4.1 Lord Denning‟s judgment  
Lord Denning began by saying that  
This case might be called the ―Three in one.‖ Three companies in one. 
Alternatively, the ―One in three.‖ One group of three companies. For the moment 
I will speak of it as ―the firm.‖17 (1) 
 
Having rehearsed the facts, he referred to section 5 of the Land Compensation Act 
1961, under which compensation could be paid for the value of the land and for 
disturbance of the business. He then set out the problem:  
If the firm and its property had all been in one ownership, it would have been 
entitled to compensation under those two heads: first, the value of the land, 
which has been assessed in excess of £360,000. Second, compensation for 
disturbance in having its business closed down.18 (2) 
 
However,  
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 (1975) 30 P & CR 251, 255 
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 [1976] 1 WLR 852, 857 
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 [1976] 1 WLR 852, 857 
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the firm and its property were not in one ownership. It was owned by three 
companies. The business was owned by the parent company, D.H.N. Food 
Distributors Ltd. The land was owned at the time of acquisition by a subsidiary, 
called Bronze Investments Ltd. The vehicles were owned by another subsidiary, 
D.H.N. Food Transport Ltd. The parent company D.H.N. held all the shares both 
in the Bronze company and in the Transport company.19 (3)  
 
Consequently, there were obstacles to the companies claiming compensation:  
The acquiring authority say that the owners of the land were Bronze Investments 
Ltd., and that company are entitled to the value of the land £360,000. They have 
actually been paid it. But the acquiring authority say that that company are not 
entitled to compensation for disturbance because they were not disturbed at all. 
The authority admit that D.H.N. (who ran the business) and the Transport 
subsidiary (who owned the vehicles) were greatly disturbed in their business. But 
the acquiring authority say that those two companies are not entitled to any 
compensation at all, not even for disturbance, because they had no interest in 
the land, legal or equitable.20 (4)  
 
Lord Denning observed that the three companies ‗could have put their house in order‘ 
by taking ‗a very simple step‘: 
Being in control of all three companies, they could have arranged for Bronze to 
convey the land to D.H.N.... D.H.N., being the owners, could also claim 
compensation for disturbance. So at any time up to October 30, 1970, this group 
of three companies could have put themselves in an unassailable position to 
claim not only the value of the land but also compensation for disturbance.21 (5) 
 
However, since that had not been done,  
The acquiring authority say that, by failing to do it, the group have missed the 
boat. They are left behind on the quay because of the technical provisions of our 
company law whereby each of the three companies is in law a separate person. 
Each of its interests must be considered separately. D.H.N. had no interest in the 
land. It was only a licensee. So it cannot claim compensation for disturbance.22 
(6)  
 
Lord Denning then rehearsed the arguments of counsel for DHN as to why the veil 
should be lifted. Lord Denning‘s own observations on the point were as follows.  
We all know that in many respects a group of companies are treated together for 
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the purpose of general accounts, balance sheet, and profit and loss account. 
They are treated as one concern. Professor Gower in Modern Company Law, 
3rd ed. (1969), p. 216 says: ―there is evidence of a general tendency to ignore 
the separate legal entities of various companies within a group, and to look 
instead at the economic entity of the whole group.‖23 (7) 
 
For Lord Denning, this was  
especially the case when a parent company owns all the shares of the 
subsidiaries — so much so that it can control every movement of the 
subsidiaries. These subsidiaries are bound hand and foot to the parent company 
and must do just what the parent company says.24 (8) 
 
He referred to the decision of the House of Lords in Harold Holdsworth25 as  
 
A striking incidence26 (9)  
 
of this.  
 
So too in the current case:  
 
This group is virtually the same as a partnership in which all the three companies 
are partners.27 (10) 
 
Indeed, 
They should not be treated separately so as to be defeated on a technical point. 
They should not be deprived of the compensation which should justly be payable 
for disturbance.28 (11) 
 
Therefore,  
The three companies should, for present purposes, be treated as one, and the 
parent company D.H.N. should be treated as that one. So D.H.N. are entitled to 
claim compensation accordingly. It was not necessary for them to go through a 
conveyancing device to get it.... These companies as a group are entitled to 
compensation not only for the value of the land, but also compensation for 
disturbance.29 (12) 
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3.4.2 Goff LJ‟s judgment 
Goff LJ also saw the case as one in which the court was  
 entitled to look at the realities of the situation and to pierce the corporate veil.30 
(13) 
 
Goff LJ said that he wished to safeguard himself by restricting his judgment to the 
particular facts of the case only; he did not accept that it would be appropriate to 
pierce the veil in every group situation. Here, however,  
the two subsidiaries were both wholly owned; further, they had no separate 
business operations whatsoever; thirdly, in my judgment, the nature of the 
question involved is highly relevant, namely, whether the owners of this business 
have been disturbed in their possession and enjoyment of it.31 (14) 
 
In support for his view, Goff LJ cited three cases. The first was Harold Holdsworth; 
Goff LJ read the comments from Lord Reid which are reproduced at 3.2.1 above. He 
felt that this case was pertinent since  
D.H.N. could, as it were, by moving the pieces on their chess board, have put 
themselves in a position in which the question would have been wholly 
unarguable.32(15) 
The second case was the Scottish Co-Operative case; Shaw LJ quoted the words of 
Viscount Simonds which have been reproduced in chapter 3.2.2 above. Finally, he 
quoted from the judgment of Danckwerts L.J. in Merchandise Transport Ltd. v. British 
Transport Commission,33 a licensing case which had concerned a parent and 
subsidiary company:  
―[the cases] show that where the character of a company, or the nature of the 
persons who control it, is a relevant feature the court will go behind the mere 
status of the company as a legal entity, and will consider who are the persons as 
shareholders or even as agents who direct and control the activities of a 
company which is incapable of doing anything without human assistance.‖34 (16)  
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3.4.3 Shaw LJ‟s judgment  
Shaw LJ highlighted the fact that  
there was so complete an identity of the different companies comprised in the 
so-called group that they ought to be regarded for this purpose as a single entity. 
The completeness of that identity manifested itself in various ways. The directors 
of D.H.N. were the same as the directors of Bronze; the shareholders of Bronze 
were the same as in D.H.N., the parent company, and they had a common 
interest in maintaining on the property concerned the business of the group.35 
(17)  
 
If each member of the group is regarded as a company in isolation, nobody at all 
could have claimed compensation in a case which plainly calls for it. Bronze 
would have had the land but no business to disturb; D.H.N. would have had the 
business but no interest in the land.36 (18)  
 
In this utter identity and community of interest between D.H.N. and Bronze there 
was no flaw at all. As Bronze did not trade and carried on no business. It had no 
actual or potential creditors other than its own parent, D.H.N.37 (19) 
 
Like both Lord Denning (see extract 5 above) and Goff LJ (see extract 15), Shaw LJ 
noted that  
The directors of [DHN] could at any time they chose have procured the transfer 
of the legal title from Bronze to itself… if they had gone through that formal 
operation the day before the notice to treat was served… they would have had a 
secure claim for compensation for disturbance. Accordingly, they could in law 
have sought and obtained whatever advantages were derived up to that date 
from a separation of title and interest between the two companies and still quite 
legitimately have re-disposed matters… so as to qualify for compensation. They 
could not have been criticised, still less prevented, if they had chosen to do so. 
Yet if the decision of the Lands Tribunal be right, it made all the difference that 
they had not.38 (20) 
 
According to Shaw LJ,  
no abuse [was] precluded by disregarding the bonds which bundled D.H.N. and 
Bronze together in a close and, so far as Bronze was concerned, indissoluble 
relationship. 
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Why then should this relationship be ignored in a situation in which to do so does 
not prevent abuse but would on the contrary result in what appears to be a 
denial of justice?39 (21)  
 
He emphasised the degree of control that DHN exercised over Bronze:  
If the strict legal differentiation between the two entities of parent and subsidiary 
must, even on the special facts of this case, be observed, the common factors in 
their identities must at the lowest demonstrate that the occupation of D.H.N. 
would and could never be determined without the consent of D.H.N. itself. If it 
was a licence at will, it was at the will of the licensee, D.H.N., that the licence 
subsisted. Accordingly, it could have gone on for an indeterminate time; that is to 
say, so long as the relationship of parent and subsidiary continued, which means 
for practical purposes for as long as D.H.N. wished to remain in the property for 
the purposes of its business.40 (22) 
 
Shaw LJ concluded by saying,  
The President of the Lands Tribunal took a strict legalistic view of the respective 
positions of the companies concerned. It appears to me that it was too strict in its 
application to the facts of this case, which are, as I have said, of a very special 
character, for it ignored the realities of the respective roles which the companies 
filled. I would allow the appeal.41 (23) 
 
3.5 Commentary 
3.5.1 The judges‟ reasoning 
David Kershaw points out that, although all three judges‘ agree that the veil between 
the parent and subsidiary companies should be lifted, they express different reasons 
for their decision.42 For Lord Denning, the key issue was the complete control 
exercised by the parent over the subsidiary (extract 8 above). He was also - as so 
often - clearly concerned that strict legal technicalities should not prevent justice being 
done on the facts (extracts 11 and 12).  
Goff LJ also alluded to the fact that Bronze had no independent business operations 
of its own, and the fact that the two subsidiaries were wholly owned by DHN (extract 
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14). Control was clearly also a pertinent factor (extract 16). 
For Shaw LJ, control was also relevant: it was because of DHN‘s control of Bronze 
that DHN occupied the premises (extracts 20 and 22). Like Goff LJ, he also referred to 
the fact that Bronze had no independent business operations of its own, and the ‗utter 
identity‘ of the interests of the three companies (extract 19). Like Lord Denning, he too 
was seemingly motivated by a desire to do justice on the facts (extract 21) in a case 
which ‗plainly call[ed]‘ for compensation to be paid (extract 18).  
Kershaw draws out three themes which underlie the judges‘ decisions to lift the veil: 
the complete control exercised by the parent over the subsidiary; the complete identity 
of interests of the three companies and the absence of any independent business 
operations by the subsidiary; and a desire to do justice to the facts of the case.43 One 
might add a fourth, perhaps unifying theme: a desire to look at the ‗realities‘ presented 
by the ‗economic entity of the whole group‘, such that it should be regarded as a 
‗single entity‘, notwithstanding the ‗technical provisions of our company law‘ (see 
extracts 13 and 23, 7, 17 and 6 respectively). Echoes of the tension between ―form‖ 
and ―substance,‖ which underpinned the respective decisions of the Court of Appeal 
and the House of Lords in Salomon itself, are apparent. It is surely self-evident as to 
why DHN later became the cornerstone of the ―single economic unit‖ argument used 
in Adams.   
 
3.5.2 Criticisms   
DHN has been subject to trenchant academic criticism, notably from Graham Rixon.44  
Firstly, Rixon refers to Lord Denning‘s quote from Professor Gower (see extract 7 
above), and accuses him of taking him out of context:   
When read in context, the statement of Gower quoted by Lord Denning M.R. is 
found to have been made merely by way of an aside to what Gower himself 
described as a ―tentative‖ conclusion which might ―perhaps, be drawn‖. Elsewhere 
in his Principles of Modern Company Law, in a passage presumably overlooked by 
the Master of the Rolls, Gower stated that ―the rule that a company is distinct from 
its members applies equally to the separate companies of a group‖.45 
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He also criticises Lord Denning for his reading of Harold Holdsworth. Far from seeing 
this case as a ‗striking instance‘ of the ‗tendency to ignore the separate legal entities of 
various companies within a group‘ (as per Lord Denning at extracts 9 and 7 
respectively), Rixon describes Harold Holdsworth as ‗a most unsure foundation‘ for the 
DHN decision:  
Viscount Kilmuir L.C., Lord Morton of Henryton and Lord Reid merely took 
cognizance of the fact that the appellant company owned all the shares in its 
subsidiary and might, by the exercise of its controlling interest and going through 
formal procedure, procure the appointment of the respondent as managing director 
of the subsidiary company; nowhere in the speeches of those judges is there any 
suggestion that the separate personae of the parent and subsidiary companies 
might be disregarded. On the contrary, Lord Morton said ([1955] 1 WLR 352, 363: 
―It is true that each company in the group is in law a separate entity, the business 
whereof is to be carried on by its own directors and managing director, if any…‖46 
 
Finally, Rixon is critical of the court‘s attempts to ‗do justice‘, since lifting the veil ‗in fact 
allowed the parent company to evade a disadvantage of an arrangement the 
advantages of which - one being the avoidance of stamp duties - the parent company 
had sought and enjoyed and that the Court of Appeal earlier had held a corporator 
might not do.‘47 
 
Rixon is thus critical of the court for allowing the parent company to ‗blow hot and cold 
and have the best of both worlds,‘48 i.e. allowing DHN to enjoy the advantages of 
separate personality but not the disadvantages. For Rixon, therefore, DHN is quite 
simply ‗an aberration.‘49 
 
As we shall see later, some of Rixon‘s criticisms are echoed in some subsequent cases. 
Initially, however, DHN was received positively both by academics and in the courts. It 
seemingly promised drastically to reshape the landscape concerning Salomon and veil-
lifting in the group context.  
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3.6 DHN: the early reaction 
3.6.1 Academic reaction 
As alluded to in chapter 3.1, the DHN decision initially prompted excited reactions from 
academics. Some writers genuinely – almost triumphantly - believed that the ruling 
would unseat Salomon from its place of pre-eminence. Schmitthoff declared that in the 
light of the DHN decision, ‗Salomon is in the shadow. It... no longer occupies the centre 
of the company stage... it has been dethroned from the position of the most important 
case in company law and now occupies the position of one of the ordinary cases on 
which the structure of company law rests.‘50 Powles similarly remarked that the DHN 
decision ‗clearly weakens further the importance of [Salomon] where companies are 
organised as a group,‘51 and commented that it ‗would appear to give the corporate veil 
a gossamer-like quality.‘52 As noted at 3.1 above, Sugarman and Webb argued that the 
case had the potential to ‗undermine the rigid rule interpretation of Salomon‟s case; and, 
thereby, put into question its centrality in company law theory.‘53 They further argued 
that it was ‗but a short step‘ from the considerations in the DHN to ‗the proposition that 
the courts may disregard Salomon‟s case whenever it is just to do so.‘54 Given that 
Salomon was not mentioned by any of the three judges, nor even pleaded in argument 
by counsel for either side,55 such a reaction is surely understandable – even if, as we 
shall see, they were proved wrong in the long run.  
 
Two strands in these early academic reactions are notable. Firstly, there is recognition 
that the grounds for lifting the veil in DHN were distinct from the ―agency‖ argument 
used in cases such as Smith Stone Knight v Birmingham Corporation. Powles, for 
example, noted that the agency principle at least ‗regard[s] the corporate entity doctrine 
as being fully in force, in that a subsidiary cannot be an agent of the parent if it were not 
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a separate legal person.‘56 On the other hand, he put DHN into the same category as 
cases such as Harold Holdsworth and Littlewoods Mail Order Stores Ltd v McGregor, as 
decisions in which the courts had ‗been prepared to adjust the legal position of 
companies within groups without reference to the agency principle at all, which [had] 
involved nothing less than ignoring the concept of corporate personality and treating all 
the companies in the group as synonymous with the parent company.‘57 Whilst praising 
the decision as ‗a victory for common sense over technicality‘, Powles nevertheless 
criticised the Court of Appeal for the ‗casual manner‘ in which it had ‗swept aside‘ the 
Salomon doctrine, leading to a lack of clarity about ‗the legal status of a subsidiary in a 
group.‘58 He also believed that the reasoning behind the decision had been superfluous: 
‗With the well-tried doctrine of agency with which to effect justice, the court appears to 
have embarked on an unnecessary and unconstructive measure of judicial legislation.‘59 
Sugarman and Webb similarly noted the readiness of the court to ‗discard the crutch of 
―agency.‖‘60 These writers apparently overlook the fact that the ―agency‖ argument was 
rejected by the Lands Tribunal at first instance.61 Moreover, whilst Smith Stone & Knight 
was cited in argument in the Court of Appeal,62 the ―agency‖ argument does not seem to 
have been emphasised by counsel for DHN, since it is not mentioned by any of the 
three judges. Nevertheless, these writers are clearly correct to see DHN as a decision in 
which the veil was lifted on an altogether different basis.  
 
Secondly, there is a recognition that DHN purported to change the landscape only in 
relation to corporate groups, rather than in relation to companies wholly owned by 
individuals. Powles, for example, noted that the agency argument had been 
successfully used in group situations, rather than in situations where the shareholders 
had been natural persons; his treatment of DHN likewise fits into a wider discussion 
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about groups.63 More recently, Kershaw too has noted that DHN (like Smith Stone & 
Knight beforehand and like Woolfson and Adams subsequently) deals with veil-piercing 
within the context of a group relationship rather than that of a one-man company. 
Kershaw therefore distinguishes DHN from Salomon and limits its application to 
corporate groups only.64 Initially, at least, the courts also applied DHN approvingly in 
group situations.  
 
3.6.2 Judicial reaction 
The DHN judgment was given on 4 March 1976. The first judicial consideration of DHN 
came on 23 March 1976, when the Court of Appeal gave judgment in the case of 
Canada Enterprises Corporation Ltd v MacNab Distilleries Ltd.65 In a commercial 
dispute involving two companies making claims and cross-claims against each other 
and their respective parent companies, the issue arose as to whether the veil between 
the parents and subsidiaries on each side could be lifted. The court held that it had 
sufficiently wide discretion under the Rules of the Supreme Court to look behind the 
companies involved in the dispute, and to ascertain who controlled them. Cairns LJ 
acknowledged that piercing the veil would be ‗contrary to the well-known principle of 
Salomon‘ but also referred to ‗the very recent case‘ of DHN as an authority for the 
proposition that the veil could be pierced in certain situations.66 
 
In Littlewoods Organisation Ltd v Harris,67 Harris was employed by Littlewoods. He 
covenanted not to work for Great Universal Stores Ltd (―GUS‖, one of Littlewoods‘ 
competitors) or any of its subsidiaries within twelve months of determining his contract 
with Littlewoods. GUS had both UK-based and overseas subsidiaries. In 1977, Harris 
resigned, informing Littlewoods that he had accepted an offer of employment from the 
GUS group. Littlewoods sought assurances from Harris that he would honour the 
restrictive covenant. When he refused to give that assurance, Littlewoods applied, 
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initially unsuccessfully, for an injunction. For the Court of Appeal, the issue was whether 
the restrictive covenant – in particular, the restraint on Harris working for subsidiaries of 
GUS - was reasonable in its scope. The Court of Appeal construed it as referring only to 
GUS‘s UK-based subsidiaries, and therefore upheld it (Browne LJ dissenting). The 
following extract from the judgment of Lord Denning, in which (unsurprisingly) he refers 
to the DHN decision, warrants repeating in full:  
[The restraint of trade clause] is said to be too wide in that it prevents Mr Harris 
being concerned or interested in the businesses of Great Universal Stores and its 
subsidiaries — and those businesses are infinitely varied and are worldwide: 
whereas Littlewoods are Confined to the United Kingdom and operate in the two 
fields only of a mail order business and a chain of retail stores. 
 
I would first consider the phrase ―Great Universal Stores or any company 
subsidiary thereto.‖ It appears that Great Universal Stores have 200 or more 
subsidiaries all over the world, carrying an all sorts of businesses. An instance 
given in argument was a restaurant in Alice Springs in the centre of Australia. 
Does that invalidate the clause? Is the introduction of ―subsidiaries‖ a ground for 
not enforcing it? This is an important point in these days when so many companies 
are multinational in their operations. The answer is, I think, the law to-day has 
regard to the realities of big business. It takes the group as being one concern 
under one supreme control. It does not regard each subsidiary as being a separate 
and independent entity… 
 
A recent illustration of this tendency is D.H.N. Food Distributors Ltd. v. Tower 
Hamlets London Borough Council [1976] 1 W.L.R. 852 where the group was 
regarded virtually as a partnership in which all the subsidiaries were partners. 
Likewise in the present case the phrase ―Great Universal Stores or any company 
subsidiary thereto‖ denotes in reality one group in which the individual subsidiaries 
cannot usefully be distinguished one from the other. The group is under one 
unified control. Those in charge of the group are able to switch a servant from one 
subsidiary to another without any difficulty whatever. They can lend his services or 
transmit his information and knowledge, as they please, within the group. If the 
clause is to afford any protection to Littlewoods at all, it must cover the whole GUS 
group, that is, not only the parent company but also its subsidiaries.68 
 
The parallels between Lord Denning‘s words here, and extracts 7 to 13, 17 and 23 in 
the DHN judgments quoted above, are clear.  
 
Initially, then, it seemed that the courts would vindicate the academic predictions that 
Salomon‟s demise was at hand in group situations. However, this judicial trend did not 
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last long: a year before judgment in Littlewoods Organisation Ltd v Harris had been 
given in August 1977, the tide had already started to turn. 
 
3.7 The tide turns: The Albazero and Woolfson 
3.7.1 The Albazero (July 1976)69 
The subject matter of this shipping case did not directly concern issues relating to 
corporate personality. Neither Salomon nor DHN were mentioned in the judgment or 
cited in argument. In the House of Lords, however, Roskill LJ (as he then was) 
remarked that it was a ‗fundamental principle of English law long established and now 
unchallengeable by judicial decision,‘ that 
each company in a group of companies… is a separate legal entity possessed of 
separate legal rights and liabilities so that the rights of one company in a group 
cannot be exercised by another company in that group even though the ultimate 
benefit of the exercise of those rights would enure beneficially to the same person 
or corporate body irrespective of the person or body in whom those rights were 
vested in law.70  
 
Even though expressed obiter, this statement strongly affirms the primacy of Salomon in 
group situations, over and against the approach taken in DHN. Indeed, The Albazero 
has subsequently become (literally) a textbook case on the point.71 Clearly, this 
statement did not bode well for the future of DHN.  
 
3.7.2 Woolfson v Strathclyde Regional Council (February 1978)72  
A stronger statement against DHN was made in Woolfson, a Scottish case concerning 
similar (albeit not identical) facts.  
 
Campbell (Glasgow) Ltd (―Campbell‖) operated a shop from five adjoining premises. 
999 of the 1,000 issued shares of Campbell were owned by Mr Woolfson. The other one 
was owned by his wife. Mr Woolfson was the sole director. Three of the premises were 
owned by Woolfson and the other two by Solfred Holdings Limited (―Solfred‖). Woolfson 
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held two-thirds of the shares in Solfred; the remainder were held by his wife. Campbell 
paid rent to Solfred and Woolfson for the premises owned by each of them respectively. 
Campbell kept its own accounts. Its profits were subject to (what was) Schedule D tax. 
Campbell had been treated as occupier in respect of (what were) Schedule A tax 
returns. Campbell was shown in the valuation roll as occupier of the premises. The 
premises were compulsorily acquired by the local authority. Woolfson and Solfred jointly 
sought compensation for disturbance in respect of all the premises. For the claim to 
succeed, they needed to demonstrate that they both owned and occupied the premises. 
The problem, of course, was that the premises were occupied by Campbell.  
 
Relying upon DHN, Woolfson and Solfred argued, that (in Lord Keith‘s words in the 
House of Lords) the ‗the court should set aside the legalistic view that Woolfson, Solfred 
and Campbell were each a separate legal persona, and concentrate attention upon the 
―realities‖ of the situation, to the effect of finding that Woolfson was the occupier as well 
as the owner of the whole premises.‘73 The Lands Tribunal for Scotland and, on appeal, 
the Second Division of the Court of Session refused to award such compensation, on 
the ground that Campbell was the occupier of the premises and was separate from 
Woolfson and Solfred. The Second Division of the Court of Session also affirmed that 
the Salomon principle ‗must normally receive full effect in relations between the 
company and persons dealing with it,‘74 and cited Ormerod LJ‘s judgment in Tunstall v 
Steigmann, to the effect that ‗any departure from a strict observance of the principle laid 
down in Salomon has been made to deal with special circumstances, such as when a 
limited company might well be a façade concealing the real facts.‘75 Woolfson appealed 
to the House of Lords.  
 
The House of Lords distinguished the case from DHN on factual grounds. In DHN, 
Bronze (which owned the land) was the wholly-owned subsidiary of DHN (which 
operated the business). DHN had complete control over the operation of the business 
and no other person had any interest in the assets of the subsidiary. In Woolfson, 
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however, Campbell (which operated the business) had no control over Solfred and 
Woolfson (who owned the land). Mr Woolfson held only two-thirds of the shares in 
Solfred; Solfred had no interest in Campbell; and Mr Woolfson could not be treated as 
the outright owner of the shares in Campbell since his wife held her one share outright 
and not as his nominee.  
 
More importantly, the House of Lords also cast significant doubt upon the DHN 
decision. Lord Keith said:  
I have some doubts whether in this respect the Court of Appeal properly applied 
the principle that it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil only where special 
circumstances exist indicating that is a mere façade concealing the true facts. 
Further, the decisions of this House in Caddies v. Harold Holdsworth &Co. (Wake-
field) Ltd. 1955 S.C. (H.L.) 27 and Meyer v. Scottish Co-operative Wholesale 
Society Ltd. 1958 S.C. (H.L.) 40, which were founded on by Goff L.J. in support of 
this ground of judgment and, as to the first of them, to some extent also by Lord 
Denning, M.R., do not, with respect, appear to me to be concerned with that 
principle.76  
 
For Lord Keith, the ―facade‖ situation was the only instance where the veil should be 
pierced. He doubted both the judges‘ rationale for lifting the veil in DHN, and their 
reading of the cases upon which they had based their decision.  Kershaw notes that, for 
the House of Lords in Woolfson, the basis of the DHN decision was the fact that the 
subsidiary was controlled by the holding company ‗in every respect‘. The Lords did not 
consider or comment on the other issues mentioned by the court in DHN, namely the 
lack of independent operations on the parts of the subsidiaries, and the desire to do 
justice on the facts of the case (see extracts 11, 14, 19 and 21 of the DHN judgment 
above). Nevertheless, if The Albazero had sounded a warning, Woolfson ‗clearly [left] 
DHN in an unhealthy condition‘(!)77  
 
3.7.3 Attempting to stem the tide: Amalgamated Investment and Lewis Trusts 
DHN nevertheless briefly continued to influence the English courts - presumably 
because, as a Scottish case, Woolfson was merely persuasive and not binding. In 
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Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd (in liquidation) v Texas Commerce 
International Bank Ltd,78 Lord Denning (again, unsurprisingly) cited DHN as authority for 
the proposition that a guarantee could be construed as a pledge to pay both the lender 
bank and the wholly-owned subsidiary that it had formed to channel the loan. In Lewis 
Trusts v Bambers Stores Ltd, DHN was referred to, obiter, by Dillon LJ in the Court of 
Appeal, as authority for the proposition that the veil between companies in a group 
could be pierced in certain situations; Woolfson was not mentioned.79 However, it would 
not be long before the English courts, too, would retreat from the ―single economic unit‖ 
argument espoused in DHN.  
 
3.8 The screw tightens: Multinational, Dimbleby, Pinn & Wheeler 
3.8.1 Multinational Gas and Petroleum Co v Multinational Gas & Petrochemical 
 Services Ltd80 
Three multinational oil companies, incorporated in Japan, the US and France, promoted 
and registered a company in Liberia, named Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co. 
(―Multinational‖), to deal in oil products. For tax reasons, the three oil companies then 
registered Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Services Ltd. (―Services‖) in England. 
Services was wholly owned by the three oil companies, and operated as Multinational‘s 
agent and adviser. The business failed and Multinational entered liquidation. The 
liquidator received reports that Services had acted negligently in drawing up financial 
information for Multinational. He was also believed that Multinational‘s directors - who, it 
was alleged, had acted ‗in accordance with the directions and at the behest of‘81 the 
three oil companies - had also acted negligently. He therefore initiated an action in tort 
against Services. He also applied for leave to commence concurrent proceedings 
against the three oil companies (i.e. Services‘ shareholders) and serve them outside the 
jurisdiction. As Lawton LJ said in his judgment in the Court of Appeal:  
Some of [Multinational‘s] creditors… wanted to make the oil companies discharge 
at least some of [Multinational‘s] liabilities, [Multinational] being their creature. The 
oil companies… had enough assets to do so. [Multinational‘s creditors] were not 
                                                          
78
 [1982] QB 84 (CA) 
79
 [1983] FSR 453, 470-471 (CA) 
80
 [1983] Ch 258 (CA) 
81
 [1983] Ch 258, 265 
 37  
 
interested in Services, who were just as much a creature of the oil companies as 
[Multinational] was, save perhaps as a route by which they could reach the oil 
companies.82 
 
If those actions were ultimately successful, the parent oil companies would be liable for 
the debts of Services, their subsidiary. This, clearly, would contravene the principles of 
Salomon and The Albazero.  
 
The Court of Appeal refused to grant leave to serve the oil companies outside the 
jurisdiction. 
Lawton LJ (Dillon LJ agreeing with him) was clear that Multinational was ‗at law a 
different legal person from the subscribing oil company shareholders and was not their 
agent: see the Salomon case.‘83 He also affirmed that ‗the oil companies as 
shareholders were not liable to anyone except to the extent and the manner provided by 
the Companies Act 1948‘, again citing Salomon as authority.84 Similarly, he emphasised 
that the oil companies ‗as shareholders were [not] under any duty of care to the plaintiff.‘ 
Although May L.J. dissented on the ‗―company law point‖‘, he ‗nowhere suggested that 
Multinational might properly be treated as one with its parent companies so as to render 
those companies liable for Multinational's debts.‘85  
 
Significantly, DHN was not cited by any of the judges, nor was it mentioned in argument 
by counsel. Overall, Multinational clearly affirmed the primacy of Salomon in a group 
context. This was not to everybody‘s liking. Lord Wedderburn lamented that the case 
showed up  
 
the geriatric deficiencies in various principles of company law... How can poor old 
Salomon be expected to cope with Multinational Gas... predominant reality is not 
today the company. It is the corporate group.... Those who trumpet the ―rule of 
law‖ cannot be taken seriously if they have nothing to say about that. Let us test 
the next Companies Bill by that measure.86 
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Lord Wedderburn doubtless died87 disappointed that neither the 1985 nor the 2006 
Companies Acts had changed the position regarding the separate liabilities of 
companies in groups. 
 
3.8.2 Dimbleby & Sons Ltd v National Union of Journalists88 
In this case, workers were employed by one company, but picketed another company 
within the same group. The House of Lords ruled that this was unlawful secondary 
picketing, as the companies within the group were separate entities. Once again, DHN 
was not mentioned at all, either in argument or in the judgment. Lord Diplock specifically 
referred to Salomon:  
The ―corporate veil‖ in the case of companies incorporated under the Companies 
Act is drawn by statute and it can be pierced by some other statute if such other 
statute so provides; but in view of its raison d‘être and its consistent recognition by 
the courts since Salomon… one would expect that any parliamentary intention to 
pierce the corporate veil would be expressed in clear and unequivocal language.89  
 
 
3.8.3 National Dock Labour Board v Pinn & Wheeler Ltd90  
This case concerned three related companies: Pinn & Wheeler Ltd (―Pinn‖), K & B 
Forest Products Ltd (―K & B‖), and The Sabah Timber Co Ltd (―Sabah‖). Pinn and K & B 
were both wholly-owned subsidiaries of Sabah. Cargo belonging to Sabah was 
unloaded by employees of Pinn, at Pinn‘s wharf. Pinn‘s employees were not registered 
dock workers. The cargo was then processed at K & B‘s mill, which did not have any 
waterside frontage. Within the context of a labour dispute, it was necessary to ascertain 
whether this work carried out by ―waterside manufacturers,‖ i.e. a manufacturer with a 
facility at the water‘s edge. According to this definition, Pinn would be a ―waterside 
manufacturer‖ but the other two companies would not, unless the veils within the group 
were pierced.    
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The industrial tribunal held that all three companies constituted a ―waterside 
manufacturer,‖ on the basis that between them they had a ―waterside facility‖, i.e. Pinn‘s 
wharf, which was where Sabah‘s cargoes were loaded and unloaded, and from whence 
they were taken to K & B‘s mill. This was a clear instance of veil-piercing. The tribunal 
considered it ‗unrealistic‘ to view the three companies as ‗separate unrelated entities.‘91  
 
The National Dock Labour Board appealed. In the Queen‘s Bench Division, Macpherson 
J rejected the tribunal‘s position. He repeated Lord Keith‘s assertion, in Woolfson, that it 
was only appropriate to pierce the veil ‗in special circumstances which indicate that 
there ‗is a mere façade concealing the true facts.‘92 He also noted that whilst the 
connections between the companies were closer and tighter than those in Woolfson, 
they nevertheless ‗did not approach that set out in DHN‘. (On the one hand, Pinn and K 
& B were wholly owned by Sabah. This resembled the position in DHN, and differed 
from the position in Woolfson. On the other hand, Pinn and K&B had independent 
operations of their own, in contrast to the subsidiaries in DHN.) More importantly, he 
remarked that Lord Keith had both distinguished DHN and ‗doubted [its] deciding force‘. 
Again repeating Lord Keith, he said that in the case before him there was ‗no basis 
consonant with principle upon which on the facts of this case the corporate veil [could] 
be pierced…‘ For him, it was  
unseemly that the three companies should be allowed to unveil themselves in 
order to try to avoid the effect of the dock labour scheme. Sometimes, where an 
injustice may result, as in D.H.N. Food Distributors Ltd. v. Tower Hamlets London 
Borough Council, and where the factual circumstances as to control and so on are 
very strong, different considerations may of course arise. 
 
But where the companies are kept alive as separate legal entities for good 
commercial or historical reasons in order to keep the company's name fully alive 
and in order to maintain the loyalty of employees for example, and also probably to 
avoid redundancy and other problems, I see no reason why the veil should be 
pierced.93  
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The three companies appealed to the Court of Appeal. Before the hearing, they re-
organised their affairs such that K & B acquired the business and premises of the other 
two companies. In his lead judgment, May LJ said, ‗Were this matter therefore now to 
come before the Industrial Tribunal, there would be no need to part any corporate veil.‘94 
The Court of Appeal did not comment further on the point and therefore – presumably – 
implicitly accepted Macpherson J‘s comments about DHN.  
 
Although Macpherson J repeated Lord Keith‘s doubts about DHN, he still apparently 
conceded that there might be cases when it could apply, ‗where an injustice may result.‘ 
Nevertheless, the general tenor of Multinational, Dimbleby and Pinn and Wheeler is 
clear. If DHN had been left ‗in an unhealthy condition‘ following Woolfson, its condition 
was now even worse. In Adams v Cape Industries plc, DHN received a further, almost 
fatal blow.  
 
3.9 The door slams (nearly) shut – Adams v Cape Industries plc 
3.9.1 Adams: the facts 
The exceptionally complex facts of Adams may be summarised as follows. Cape 
Industries plc (―Cape‖), the holding company, was registered in England. It had a 
wholly-owned subsidiary, NAAC, operating in Texas. Some of NAAC‘s employees 
suffered injuries (in some cases, fatal), following exposure to asbestos. They initiated 
litigation against various parties including Cape, the holding company. Proceedings 
were initiated in New York. Cape refused to participate in these proceedings, arguing 
that it was not subject to the jurisdiction of the New York courts. Nevertheless, the New 
York courts awarded damages against Cape. Since Cape‘s assets were largely situated 
in England, the claimants attempted to enforce the New York judgement in England. In 
order to succeed, the claimants needed to prove that Cape, as opposed to its 
subsidiary, had been ―present‖, i.e. carrying on operations, in Texas.  
 
On a strict application of Salomon, the claimants‘ case would fail, since Cape and 
NAAC were separate legal entities. The claimants ran three arguments as to why the 
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veil between the parent company and the subsidiary should be pierced. The first was 
the ―agency‖ argument, namely that NAAC was the agent of Cape, the principal, and 
therefore Cape should be held liable for the judgment against NAAC. The second was 
the ―single economic unit‖ argument, namely that Cape and NAAC should be treated as 
a single economic entity. The third was the ―corporate veil‖ argument, under which the 
claimants maintained that two of Cape‘s other subsidiaries (i.e. not NAAC) had been set 
up as a façade to cover improprieties.  
 
3.9.2 Adams: the judgment  
Whilst noting that both the ―agency‖ and ―corporate veil‖ arguments failed on the facts, 
we will here focus primarily on how the court dealt with the ―single economic unit‖ 
argument.95 Extracts from the judgment of Slade LJ are indented and separately 
numbered (i), (ii), (iii) etc.  
 
Firstly, for Slade LJ, there was  
no general principle that all companies in a group of companies [were] to be 
regarded as one. On the contrary, the fundamental principle [was] that "each 
company in a group of companies (a relatively modern concept) is a separate legal 
entity possessed of separate legal rights and liabilities‖: The Albazero [1977] AC 
774, 80796 (i)  
 
It was therefore  
indisputable97 (ii)  
 
that Cape and NAAC were  
in law separate legal entities98. (iii)  
 
Slade LJ noted that Mr Morison (―Morison‖) (counsel for Adams) had argued that the 
court would, where appropriate,  
ignore the distinction in law between members of a group of companies treating 
them as one, and that broadly speaking, it [would] do so whenever it consider[ed] 
that justice so demands.99 (iv) 
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He quoted at length from various cases cited by Morison, including DHN. He also noted 
that Morison had stressed the importance of looking at the  
 
commercial reality100 (v)  
 
Slade LJ stated that in cases such as Holdsworth and Scottish Co-Operative, and 
likewise in DHN, the decisions to lift the veil had turned on  
 
the relevant statutory provisions for compensation101 (vi)  
 
Moreover,  
the correctness of the [DHN] decision was doubted by the House of Lords in 
Woolfson102 (vii) 
 
He then made an extremely important statement:  
Mr Morison described the theme of all these cases as being that where legal 
technicalities would produce injustice in cases involving members of a group of 
companies, such technicalities should not be allowed to prevail. We do not think 
that the cases relied on go nearly so far as this… save in cases which turn on the 
wording of particular statutes or contracts, the court is not free to disregard the 
principle of Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1897] A.C. 22 merely because it 
considers that justice so requires. Our law, for better or worse, recognises the 
creation of subsidiary companies, which though in one sense the creatures of their 
parent companies, will nevertheless under the general law fall to be treated as 
separate legal entities with all the rights and liabilities which would normally attach 
to separate legal entities103 (viii, emphasis added)  
 
Again, Slade LJ was adamant that  
Neither in this class of case nor in any other class of case is it open to this court to 
disregard the principle of Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1897] A.C. 22 merely 
because it considers it just so to do.104 (ix)  
 
Slade LJ rehearsed Morison‘s arguments as to why Cape and NAAC should be treated 
as a single economic unit. For example, NAAC had been created as a medium for the 
sale of Cape‘s goods; Cape had taken all major policy decisions concerning NAAC; 
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NAAC‘s directors had formal functions only. Indeed, Slade LJ broadly accepted the 
submission that Cape  
ran a single integrated mining division with little regard to corporate formalities as 
between members of the group in the way in which it carried on its business105. (x)  
 
Nevertheless, there had been  
no challenge to the judge‘s finding that the corporate forms applicable to NAAC as 
a separate legal entity were observed106 (xi) 
 
Slade LJ addressed Morison‘s submission that  
Cape's control extended to the day-to-day running of N.A.A.C107 (xii) 
 
However, according to Slade LJ 
A degree of overall supervision, and to some extent control, was exercised by 
Cape over N.A.A.C. as is common in the case of any parent-subsidiary 
relationship - to a large extent through Dr. Gaze [an executive director of Cape]. In 
particular, Cape would indicate to N.A.A.C. the maximum level of expenditure 
which it should incur and would supervise the level of expenses incurred by Mr 
Morgan [NAAC‘s president]. Mr Morgan knew that he had to defer in carrying out 
the business activities of N.A.A.C. to the policy requirements of Cape as the 
controlling shareholders of N.A.A.C. Within these policy limits... the day-to-day 
running of N.A.A.C. was left to [Mr Morgan]. There is no challenge to the judge's 
findings that (a) the corporate financial control exercised by Cape over N.A.A.C. in 
respect of the level of dividends and the level of permitted borrowing was no more 
and no less than was to be expected in a group of companies such as the Cape 
group; (b) the annual accounts of N.A.A.C. were drawn on the footing that 
N.A.A.C.'s business was its own business and there was nothing to suggest that 
the accounts were drawn on a false footing.108 (xiii)  
 
Finally, he remarked that  
In the light of the set up and operations of the Cape group and of the relationship 
between Cape/Capasco and N.A.A.C. we see the attraction of the approach 
adopted by Lord Denning M.R. in the D.H.N. case [1976] 1 W.L.R. 852, 860c, 
which Mr Morison urged us to adopt: "This group is virtually the same as a 
partnership in which all the three companies are partners." In our judgment, 
however, we have no discretion to reject the distinction between the members of 
the group as a technical point. We agree with Scott J. that the observations of 
Robert Goff L.J. in Bank of Tokyo Ltd. v. Karoon (Note) [1987] A.C. 45, 64, are 
apposite: "[Counsel] suggested beguilingly that it would be technical for us to 
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distinguish between parent and subsidiary company in this context; economically, 
he said, they were one. But we are concerned not with economics but with law. 
The distinction between the two is, in law, fundamental and cannot here be 
bridged."‘109 (xiv)  
 
3.9.3 Adams: commentary  
Adams clearly deals a further blow to the ―single economic unit argument‖ as expressed 
in DHN. Extracts (i) to (iii), (viii) and (ix) above strongly affirm the principles of Salomon 
and The Albazero. Extracts (v) and (xiv) show that, in contrast to the approach in DHN, 
the court was not prepared to consider ‗economic realities‘ over and above the technical 
legal distinctions between a parent and a subsidiary company. Furthermore, according 
to Slade LJ, the DHN decision had in fact turned on the wording of the statute in 
question (extracts (vi) and (viii)). Moreover, like Macpherson J in Pinn and Wheeler (see 
chapter 3.8.3), Slade LJ noted that DHN had been doubted in Woolfson (extract (vii)).  
 
Just as Multinational left Lord Wedderburn disappointed, so too Adams created 
discontent. Following the litigation involving Cape Industries plc, Peter Muchlinski 
argued stridently in favour of reform in relation to corporate groups, particularly 
multinationals; yet he also noted, with disappointment, that the 2001 Final Report of the 
Company Law Review Steering Group said nothing about corporate groups.110 
Nevertheless, Slade LJ does leave open the possibility that in certain cases, the 
wording of a particular statute may allow the court to lift the veil between companies in 
the same group. More interestingly – as Kershaw astutely observes –extracts (xii) to 
(xiv) above do, on a close reading, leave some limited mileage in the ―single economic 
unit‖ argument. Kershaw highlights the discussion about whether Cape had been 
involved in the ‗day to day running‘ of NAAC‘s business. He suggests that, ‗had Cape in 
fact been running NAAC then the Court may have treated the two entities as one‘. For 
Kershaw, this ‗would appear consistent‘ with the phrases, ‗utter identity of community 
and interest‘ and the ‗absence of real activity in the subsidiary‘, both of which were used 
in DHN. By implication, therefore, ‗had the level of Cape‘s financial control over NAAC 
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exceeded what is typical in a parent-subsidiary relationship then this may have made 
the single economic unit argument available.‘ As such, it remains (just about) possible 
that the argument could work in cases where ‗the parent completely ignores the 
separate existence of the subsidiary.‘111  
 
3.10 Beyond Adams: door slammed tight shut, or left slightly ajar?  
Theoretically, as Kershaw argues, there appeared to remain some very limited life in 
DHN following Adams. Yet this limited life surely amounted to but the faintest breath. 
For good measure, the Court of Appeal again doubted DHN in the 1998 case of Ord v 
Belhaven Pubs Ltd,112 which is considered further in chapter 5. Such scepticism filtered 
down to the lower courts. In Buckinghamshire CC v Secretary of State for the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions and Brown, for example, Robin Purchas QC, 
sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, stated that it was erroneous to apply ‗DHN in 
preference to the other authorities‘. 113 However, two 2007 Court of Appeal judgments 
appear to have changed the picture.  
 
3.10.1 Beckett Investment Management Group Ltd v Hall114 
The claimant (―Beckett‖) was a parent company within a group of companies offering 
financial services. It provided no direct financial advice and had no direct contact with 
clients. Hall was the director of two subsidiaries and also one of Beckett‘s directors. His  
employment contract included a clause whereby he covenanted, for a period of twelve 
months following termination of his employment with Beckett, not to supply ‗advice of a 
type provided by [Beckett] in the ordinary course of its business‘ to ‗any person, firm, 
company or organisation whom or which was at any time during the period of 12 months 
immediately prior to the termination of [his] employment a client of [Beckett or one its 
subsidiaries].‘ Hall left Beckett for a competitor company, and some of Beckett‘s 
customers transferred their business to that company. Beckett sued Hall for breach of 
contract. Hall argued that the restraint of trade provision was meaningless since 
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Beckett, as a holding company, did not provide direct advice; ‗the individual personality 
of a company was not to be disregarded [merely because] the company in question was 
a member of a group of companies.‘115 He further argued that Beckett had no clients of 
its own and therefore no interest which would be safeguarded by the provision and that, 
even though one of its subsidiaries had clients, it had not been party to the covenant in 
question. At first instance, the court agreed with him, upheld the separateness of the 
companies within the group, and ruled that he had not breached the restraint of trade 
covenant. In the Court of Appeal, however, Kay LJ took an opposite approach. 
Declining to take ‗a purist approach to corporate personality,‘116 he construed the clause 
more widely, so as to apply to advice of the kind provided by one of the subsidiary 
companies. Significantly, he directly quoted,117 with approval, Lord Denning‘s words in 
Littlewoods Organisation Ltd v Harris (quoted above in chapter 3.6.2):  
The answer is, I think, the law today has regard to the realities of big business. It 
takes the group as being once concern under supreme control.  
 
Whilst Kay LJ made no direct reference to DHN, the fact that he referred to a case 
which itself drew on the DHN principle, hints at a rehabilitation of the ―single economic 
unit‖ argument. 
 
3.10.2 Adelson v Associated Newspapers Ltd118  
In this case, ‗a company sought to amend its libel claim by adding a claim for damage to 
the reputations of two of its subsidiaries, which were not parties to the claim.‘119 If 
successful, this would clearly represent a departure from the principle of separate 
personality. During the course of argument in a related application, the Court of Appeal 
apparently suggested that it  
might wish to explain or develop the law in some way which would enable a non-
trading holding company to recover in defamation proceedings for injury done to 
the group as a whole… or for damage to the reputation of trading subsidiaries.120 
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However, Eady J felt bound to ‗apply the law as it [was], and not as it might develop in 
the future.‘121 He therefore refused the application, on the basis that companies are 
separate entities, and one company cannot recover losses incurred by another – a strict 
application of Salomon (and, indeed, of Foss v Harbottle). Nevertheless, Adelson and 
Beckett together suggest that, in some situations at least, the current Court of Appeal 
leans towards disregarding Salomon in group situations more than it had done in 
Adams.  
 
3.10.3 Gripple Ltd v Revenue and Customers Commissioners and Linsen  
 International Ltd v Humpuss Sea Transport Pte Ltd 
If, however, Adelson and Beckett do point towards a ―rehabilitation‖ of DHN, the 
message has apparently yet to reach the lower courts. In the 2010 case of Gripple Ltd v 
Revenue and Customers Commissioners,122 DHN was cited in argument in an attempt 
to persuade the court to lift the veil between associated companies in relation to 
taxation issues. Henderson J rejected this as an ‗adventurous submission,‘ affirming 
that, ‗it is a commonplace of United Kingdom tax law that companies in a group, 
however closely related, are normally to be treated as separate entities.‘123 More 
recently, in Linsen International Ltd v Humpuss Sea Transport Pte Ltd,124  Flaux J 
‗repeatedly rejected the single economic entity approach by indicating that the close 
association between companies within a group without more does not justify lifting the 
veil.‘125 The contrast between these cases, and Beckett and Adelson, is marked, and 
leaves the picture unclear. One further case has the potential to change the landscape 
altogether. 
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3.10.4 Chandler v Cape Plc  
This case involved litigation arising from the same set of circumstances as Adams. 
Chandler, an employee of Cape Building Products Ltd (―Products‖), developed 
asbestosis. By the time Chandler claimed, Products was no longer in existence. 
Chandler therefore sued Products‘ parent company, Cape plc. On a strict application of 
Salomon, the claim would fail. In the High Court, however, Wyn Williams J took an 
alternative approach which bypassed Salomon altogether.126  He found that the parent 
company owed a duty of care to the employees of the subsidiary under the tort law 
principles of foreseeability, proximity and it being fair, just and reasonable to impose a 
duty.127 The Court of Appeal has recently upheld this decision.128 
 
Importantly, Wyn Williams J upheld Adams (and so, by implication, Salomon) as good 
law – ‗This is not a case in which it would be appropriate to pierce the corporate veil.‘129 
Neither DHN nor any other ―single economic unit‖ case was cited in the judgment. 
Similarly, the Court of Appeal decision rests solely on the tort law principle of ‗whether 
what the parent company did amounted to taking on a direct duty to the subsidiary‘s 
employees.‘130 Indeed, Arden LJ said 
I would emphatically reject any suggestion that this court is in any way concerned 
with what is usually referred to as piercing the corporate veil. A subsidiary and its 
company are separate entities. There is no imposition or assumption of 
responsibility by reason only that a company is the parent company of another 
company.131 
 
Technically, therefore, Chandler cannot be categorized as a ―veil-lifting‖ case. 
Nevertheless, its effect is the same as if the veil had been lifted, and it provides a 
possible alternative route for involuntary or tort creditors to follow. The implications 
should be clear. If this approach becomes commonplace, the Salomon principle will no 
longer automatically protect parent companies from liability for the torts of their 
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subsidiaries. In his aptly titled article ‗Donoghue v Salomon in the High Court,‘132 
reviewing the first-instance decision, Ewan McGaughey explores the implications 
further. He considers the liability of controlling parties for any torts, the potential liability 
of all directors and shareholders, and the liability of UK multinational parent companies 
to overseas tort claimants. As McGaughey writes, ‗the conflict of Salomon v Donoghue 
was one in which Salomon appeared for a century to have gained the upper hand. But 
that may well have changed.‘133 The fact that the Court of Appeal has upheld the first-
instance decision will no doubt be welcome to those, such as McGaughey and 
Crowe,134 who are concerned about the implications of Salomon for tort creditors.  
 
On the other hand, the fact that the Court of Appeal declined to make even obiter 
comments about wider issues relating to veil-lifting is disappointing, particularly given 
the uncertainty left by the same court following the decisions in Adelson and Beckett. If 
anything, the Chandler decision merely increases the uncertainty. After all, the above 
extract from Arden LJ‘s judgment clearly affirms the principles of Salomon and Adams, 
whereas Adelson and Beckett clearly hint at a departure from those principles. The 
Court of Appeal therefore appears to be giving conflicting messages, which is palpably 
unhelpful.  
 
3.11 DHN and beyond: summary and conclusions 
Before 2007, it would have been easy to assess the legacy of DHN. It had been 
doubted by the House of Lords in Woolfson, and by the Court of Appeal in Pinn & 
Wheeler, Adams and Ord. It had not been mentioned at all in the Court of Appeal in 
Multinational, nor in the House of Lords in The Albazero and Dimbleby. DHN had also 
subjected to trenchant academic criticism, particularly by Rixon.  Therefore, far from 
Salomon being placed ‗in the shadow‘ by DHN, as Schmitthoff had suggested in 1976, it 
was actually DHN which had been all but eclipsed. The primacy of Salomon, on the 
other hand, had been clearly affirmed in Adams. The early academic and judicial 
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excitement over DHN had been all but forgotten. Although DHN had never been 
formally overruled, and although, as Kershaw argues, it theoretically retained some very 
limited life, this surely amounted to the faintest breath. In short, DHN seemed to be one 
of many of Lord Denning‘s idiosyncratic attempts to change the law which, although 
potentially dynamic at the time, had since withered. In contrast, within the context of 
corporate groups, Salomon had indeed remained ‗the unyielding rock‘. 
 
Since 2007, Adelson and Beckett have suggested that some members of the Court of 
Appeal may after all wish to ―resurrect‖ the ―single economic unit‖ argument. Yet this 
has not filtered down to the lower courts, as is clear from the judgments in Gripple and 
Linsen. As so often in the past, the current position is therefore unclear. Following the 
judgment in Beckett, and the first-instance decisions in Chandler and Linsen, Professor 
Milman lamented that ‗the theme of unpredictability looms large when we look at veil 
lifting, whether in the context of groups or more generally. There is a real need for 
guidance from the Supreme Court on what is a fundamental feature of our system of 
corporate law.‘135 His comments echo those of Powles in the light of DHN (see chapter 
3.6.1), Lord Wedderburn in the light of Multinational (3.8.1) and Muchlinski in the light of 
Adams (3.9.3). Again, therefore, it is disappointing that the Court of Appeal did not take 
the opportunity to give even obiter guidance in Chandler.  
 
We will return to the issue of clarity and reform in chapter 6. Beforehand, however, we 
will consider two cases which, like DHN, threatened to redefine the landscape in relation 
to Salomon and veil-lifting. Re a Company136 and Creasey v Breachwood Motors Ltd137 
are covered, respectively, in chapters 4 and 5.  
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CHAPTER 4 
JUSTICE AND ONLY JUSTICE? FROM RE A COMPANY TO CONWAY V RATIU  
 
4.1  Introduction  
As we saw in chapter 3, the DHN decision initially threatened to widen drastically the 
categories where the courts would lift the veil. The ―single economic unit‖ principle might 
have seriously challenged the hegemony of Salomon. Nevertheless, the decisions in 
Woolfson, Pinn & Wheeler, Adams and Ord reaffirmed Salomon‘s dominance. Whilst 
recent decisions such as Adelson and Beckett hint at a ―rehabilitation‖ of DHN, this is as 
yet unclear.  
 
In spite of the retreat away from DHN, the Court of Appeal in 1985 justified piercing the 
veil where this was ‗necessary to achieve justice.‘1 This is clearly the widest possible 
basis for departing from the Salomon principle. In this chapter, we look first of all at the 
background to Re a Company [1985] BCLC 333, namely the decision in Wallersteiner v 
Moir.2 We will then look at the facts and judgment of Re a Company itself, and offer 
some commentary. We will then look at the subsequent judicial reaction, and also at the 
2006 case of Conway v Ratiu.3 We will then conclude by considering whether any 
scope now remains for the court to deviate from Salomon on the grounds that ‗justice so 
requires‘.  
 
4.2  Background:  Wallersteiner v Moir  
As we saw in chapter 3.2, the DHN decision echoed three cases in the 1950s and 
1960s in which the courts had relaxed their previously conservative approach to veil-
lifting. Similarly, the decision in Re a Company purported to follow a comparable case in 
the 1970s, namely Wallersteiner v Moir.4 It is unsurprising that Lord Denning, once 
again, played a significant role.  
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Mr Moir was a minority shareholder in Hartley Baird Ltd. Dr Wallersteiner was the 
majority shareholder and the managing director. In March 1967, Mr Moir had sent the 
company‘s members a circular in which he accused Dr Wallersteiner of fraud, 
misfeasance and breach of duty. Dr Wallersteiner sued him for libel. During the course 
of the ensuing litigation, Mr Moir brought a counterclaim against Dr Wallersteiner on 
behalf of the company. One of the many issues that arose in the ensuing litigation was 
whether the veil between Mr Wallersteiner and Hartley Baird Ltd (and various other 
companies in which he held shares) should be lifted.   In the Court of Appeal, Lord 
Denning said that Dr Wallersteiner had  
used many companies, trusts, or other legal entities as if they belonged to him. 
He was in control of them as much as any ―one-man company‖ is under the 
control of the one man who owns all the shares and is the chairman and 
managing director. He made contracts of enormous magnitude on their behalf 
on a sheet of notepaper without reference to anyone else.5  
 
On this basis, counsel for Mr Moir argued that the companies were used by Dr 
Wallersteiner as a façade and therefore the veil should be lifted, whilst counsel for Dr 
Wallersteiner argued that the principle in Salomon should be held ‗sacrosanct.‘ In a 
typically colourful judgment, Lord Denning held that the various companies were  
just the puppets of Dr. Wallersteiner. He controlled their every movement. Each 
danced to his bidding. He pulled the strings. No one else got within reach of 
them. Transformed into legal language, they were his agents to do as he 
commanded. He was the principal behind them. I am of the opinion that the 
court should pull aside the corporate veil and treat these concerns as being his 
creatures — for whose doings he should be, and is, responsible. At any rate, it 
was up to him to show that anyone else had a say in their affairs and he never 
did so: cf. Gilford Motor Co Ltd. v. Horne [1933] Ch. 935 , 943, 9576. 
 
The reference to Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne suggests that Lord Denning was lifting 
the veil on the grounds that the corporate structure was being used as a façade or sham 
for misdemeanours of the individual. His judgment is significant because it was the only 
case expressly referred to in Re a Company – to which we now turn. For ease of future 
reference, direct quotations from the judgment are indented and numbered. 
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4.3 Re a Company: the facts 
The case concerned an action by the liquidator of insolvent companies against a former 
director for breach of trust and deceit. There was evidence that the defendant, upon 
discovering that the companies were insolvent, had set up a network of English and 
foreign companies to hold his personal assets. It appeared that his aim was to put these 
assets beyond the reach of the liquidator.   
In the High Court, the liquidator successfully applied for Mareva injunctions restraining 
the defendant from disposing of shares in foreign companies, or of shares in English or 
foreign companies entitled to assets within England, and also restraining him from 
procuring the disposition of English assets by such companies.7 On the basis of 
Salomon and Macaura, the companies were legally separate from the defendant. Their 
assets were not his and were therefore, strictly speaking, beyond the claims of the 
liquidator. As such, the second and third orders effectively pierced the veil between the 
companies and the defendant. The trial judge justified this decision on the basis that  
the whole structure [was] but a façade behind which the… defendant was able to 
control and manipulate the operations of the company directors and trustees who 
purported to exercise independent powers.8 (1) 
The defendant appealed against the order. He argued that the mere fact that he held 
shares in foreign companies did not mean he had any interest in the foreign companies‘ 
assets. In other words, he argued that there was a veil between himself and the 
companies in which he held shares, and the assets of those companies should not be 
construed as his own assets to which the liquidator might be entitled. In response, 
counsel for the liquidator requested that the court make orders more restrictive than 
those made at first instance. 
Ultimately, then, the dispute boiled down to a question of whether the corporate veil 
between the defendant and the companies should be pierced. The defendant argued 
that this should only be done if  
the legal structure of the companies in which the first defendant had an interest… 
was a complete sham9 (2) 
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The claimant, on the other hand, argued that the veil should be lifted if  
the court was satisfied that the legal structure had some reality but none the less 
was a vehicle over which the defendant exercised substantial or effective control.10 
(3) 
 
4.4 Re a Company: the judgment  
In the Court of Appeal, the appeal was dismissed by Cumming-Bruce LJ. According to 
him, the network of companies was  
an elaborate and most ingenious scheme brought into operation at the instance of 
the first defendant, whereby his personal assets were organised in such a way that 
they were held by foreign and English corporations and trusts in a manner that 
effectively conceal[ed] his true beneficial interest in English assets.11 (4) 
 
Moreover, there was  
strong primary evidence that at the date when the first defendant realised that the 
affairs of the plaintiff companies were insolvent the first defendant was procuring 
his agents and associates to ensure that all his interests in real property in 
England and other English assets were transferred out of his apparent legal and 
beneficial ownership. The network of interlocking companies and trusts had 
already been created; after the alleged fraud pleaded in the statement of claim the 
network appears to have been used as a device to prevent the plaintiffs from 
realising the fruits of the proceedings now brought… the defendant arranged his 
affairs so that his English assets should be put outside the reach of his creditors.12 
(5)  
In similar terms, the judge stated that there was  
a strong prima facie case that the whole structure [was] but a facade behind which 
the first defendant was able to control and manipulate the operations of the 
company directors and trustees.13 (6)  
Following the observation of the trial judge that  
all the companies and bodies were vehicles for the first defendant, and… the trusts 
were devices to conceal the assets of the first defendant and his relatives14 (7)  
Cumming-Bruce LJ summarised the evidence as follows:  
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the whole construction is but a facade used to place the English assets outside the 
reach of the first defendant's creditors, including the plaintiffs15 (8)  
He then summarised the legal issue in dispute. For the defendant,  
it was only if the evidence disclosed that the legal structure of the companies in 
which the first defendant had an interest… was a complete sham that the court… 
would pierce the corporate veil and look beyond the legal entitlement to the 
English asset in question.16 (9)  
Counsel for the liquidator, by contrast, had  
contended that if, in the case of any corporation or trust, the court was satisfied 
that the legal structure had some reality but none the less was a vehicle over 
which the defendant exercised substantial or effective control, the Mareva 
injunction was appropriate in order to prevent disposal of English assets; and 
discovery by interrogatories was appropriate in order to ascertain the nature and 
extent of the first defendant's interest once it was demonstrated (as it was) that the 
vehicles were directly or indirectly entitled to English assets.17 (10)  
Awarding the more restrictive orders sought by the claimants, Cumming-Bruce LJ ruled 
as follows: 
In our view the cases before and after Wallersteiner v Moir [1974] 3 All ER 217, 
[1974] 1 WLR 991 show that the court will use its powers to pierce the corporate 
veil if it is necessary to achieve justice irrespective of the legal efficacy of the 
corporate structure under consideration. As Lord Denning MR said ([1974] 3 All 
ER 217 at 238, [1974] 1 WLR 991 at 1013) the companies there identified were 
distinct legal entries and the principles of Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 
22 prima facie applied. But only prima facie. On the facts of the Wallersteiner case, 
the companies danced to Dr Wallersteiner's bidding. Buckley LJ disagreed on the 
facts about the position of IFT, but Scarman LJ held that the evidence disclosed 
liability in Wallersteiner on the ground that he instigated the loan of £50,000.18 (11)  
In his view, the defendant had  
brought into existence the sophisticated and intricate network of interrelated 
English and foreign companies and foreign trusts as a mechanism through which 
[he] could at will dispose of his English assets19 (12) 
and had then later  
arranged that his English assets should disappear into the network of interrelated 
English and foreign legal structures of such complexity that only he and/or his 
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agents could disentangle his personal interest, or in the case of some English 
assets, he had already achieved this confusion against the contingency of a future 
judgment.20 (13)  
For Cumming-Bruce, this was sufficient to justify lifting the veil and granting the revised 
orders sought by the claimants.  
 
4.5 Re a Company: commentary  
The part of the judgment dealing with the issue of lifting the veil is notable both for its 
brevity and its scope. Extract 11 above is the only paragraph in which Cumming-Bruce 
LJ set out his legal reasoning for lifting the veil, namely ‗to achieve justice irrespective of 
the legal efficacy of the corporate structure.‘ This is surely the broadest possible 
justification, and seems to go beyond even Lord Denning‘s opinion, in Littlewoods Mail 
Order Stores Ltd v McGregor, that ‗the doctrine in Salomon‟ should be ‗watched very 
carefully.‘21 Given that the same court had, not long previously, rejected veil-lifting in the 
Multinational Gas case,22 and given that the House of Lords had done the same in 
Dimbleby & Sons Ltd v NUJ,23 the breadth of Cumming-Bruce LJ‘s statement seems 
suspect, to say the least. It is also remarkable that he specifically adduced only one 
judgment, that of Lord Denning in Wallersteiner, to support it. (Presumably he also had 
DHN in mind – in particular, Shaw LJ‘s desire to avoid ‗a denial of justice.‘24) This 
seems even more remarkable when one considers Lord Denning‘s own idiosyncratic 
tendency to ignore precedent when (in his view) it ran contrary to his desire to achieve 
justice, and the tendency of the House of Lords to overrule his decisions. One can even 
question whether Cumming-Bruce LJ rightly applied Wallersteiner. After all, Lord 
Denning‘s reference to Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne suggests that – at least in 
Wallersteiner - he lifted the veil on the grounds that the corporate structure was a 
―sham‖ or ―facade‖, rather than on the catch-all grounds of ―achieving justice.‖ We will 
return to this point in the conclusion to this chapter.  
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4.6 Re a Company: reactions 
4.6.1 Academic reactions 
Given the scope of Cumming-Bruce LJ‘s judgement, and given that it was made in the 
Court of Appeal, there seems to have been remarkably little contemporary or 
subsequent academic or judicial reaction to the case.25 (Perhaps this was a result of the 
brevity of his reasoning!) Writing before the judgment in Adams, Ziegler & Gallagher 
argued that ‗justice‘ was the ultimate ground for all examples of veil-lifting in English 
(and US and Australian) cases:  ‗it is suggested that the categories traditionally 
proposed for lifting the veil can be subsumed into the one category, viz. the prevention 
of injustice.‘26  This language clearly resembles Cumming-Bruce LJ‘s statement at 
extract 11, that ‗the court will use its powers to pierce the corporate veil if it is necessary 
to achieve justice‘. However, Ziegler and Gallagher do not mention Re a Company. This 
may suggest that they were unaware of the case, even though it would have clearly 
supported their argument. Alternatively, it may be that they were aware of it, but chose 
not to refer to it on the grounds that the legal reasoning in the case was too brief and/or 
flimsy for their purposes.  
 
4.6.2 Judicial reactions 
4.6.2.1 Adams v Cape Industries plc27 
If academic reaction to the case has been virtually non-existent, the judicial reaction, 
whilst more extensive, has generally been negative. Again, this is perhaps unsurprising 
in light of Cumming-Bruce‘s narrow, tenuous reasoning.  
The first major company law case in which Re a Company was mentioned was 
Adams.28 It was mentioned by Slade LJ under the name of X Bank v G,29 but only very 
briefly: ‗the report of X Bank Ltd. v. G. is so brief that we think it would not be safe to 
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rely on it for present purposes.‘30 More importantly, Slade LJ‘s key statement about 
―justice‖ clearly stated the diametric opposite to Re a Company: ‗save in cases which 
turn on the wording of particular statutes or contracts, the court is not free to disregard 
the principle of Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1897] A.C. 22 merely because it 
considers that justice so requires.‘31 
Subsequent judges were therefore left with two conflicting Court of Appeal judgments – 
one very wide in its scope about veil-lifting, and one very narrow. As we shall see, it was 
the approach in Adams which – at least in the lower courts - would ultimately prevail.  
 
4.6.2.2 Beyond Adams 
Following Adams, Re a Company was first mentioned in a case concerning Mareva 
injunctions – namely, Atlas Maritime Co SA v Avalon Maritime Ltd; The Coral Rose (No 
1).32 Staughton LJ briefly referred to it as ‗an exceptional case involving allegations of 
fraud and the manipulation of corporate structures‘. He did not consider it relevant to the 
case at hand. Re a Company was alluded to, but not discussed, in TSB Private Bank 
International SA v Chabra,33 another case involving Mareva injunctions. As we shall see 
in chapter 5, it was alluded to, and seemingly followed in principle, in Creasey v 
Breachwood Motors.34 However, Creasey is now so discredited that the reference 
therein to Re a Company surely reveals little. Re a Company was again briefly 
mentioned, but not discussed, in Re H (Restraint Order: Realisable Property)35 and in 
International Credit and Investment Company (Overseas) Ltd v Adham.36 Not until 
Yukong Line Ltd. of Korea v Rendsburg Investments Corporation of Liberia and Others 
(No. 2)37 (examined in more detail in chapter 5.6.2), did a judge evaluate the judgment 
in Re a Company - and that evaluation was brief and negative. Toulson J said:  
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Some authorities have suggested that the court will use its powers to pierce the 
corporate veil whenever it thinks it necessary to achieve justice (see Re a 
Company [1985] BCLC 333 at 337–338), but such a broad approach was 
disapproved by the Court of Appeal in Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] BCLC 
479 at 513, [1990] Ch 433 at 536...38 
 
The same approach was taken by Sir Andrew Morritt V-C Trustor AB v Smallbone (No. 
2)39 (considered in more detail in chapter 5.6.2.1):  
[In] Re a Company [1985] BCLC 333… a complicated structure of foreign 
companies and trusts was used to place the individual's assets beyond the reach 
of his creditors. Cumming-Bruce LJ described (at 336) the structure as a facade 
but (at 337–338) expressed the principle to be that the court will use its powers to 
pierce the corporate veil if it is necessary to achieve justice irrespective of the legal 
efficacy of the corporate structure under consideration. The latter statement is not 
consistent with the views of the Court of Appeal in Adams's case…40  
 
On this basis, the court in Trustor also declined to follow lift the veil on the grounds of 
―justice‖. The 2006 case of Conway v Ratiu,41 however, has made the picture less clear.  
 
4.6.3 Conway v Ratiu  
Conway was a solicitor who advised Ratiu in relation to a property transaction. Ratiu 
had purchased an off-the-shelf company as a vehicle for the transaction, and had 
instructed Conway in his capacity as the company‘s director. Conway later competed 
against Ratiu in bidding for another piece of land. In a letter to his estate agents, Ratiu 
alleged that Conway had breached his duty to avoid a conflict between his personal 
interest and his duty to Ratiu as his client. Conway sued Ratiu for defamation. He 
argued that he had never owed duties to Ratiu, since he had not been instructed by 
Ratiu but by the company. In the Court of Appeal, it was held, on a question of fact, that 
the solicitor had a relationship of trust and confidence with Ratiu and therefore owed 
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him (as well as the company) a fiduciary duty. A number of statements made by the 
judges are worth repeating in full.42  
 
Auld LJ referred, at [75], to  
the readiness of the courts, regardless of the precise issue involved, to draw back 
the corporate veil to do justice when common-sense and reality demand it. 
 
At [78], he said: 
There is, it seems to me, a powerful argument of principle, in this intensely 
personal context of considerations of trust, confidence and loyalty, for lifting the 
corporate veil where the facts require it to include those in or behind the 
company who are in reality the persons whose trust in and reliance upon the 
fiduciary may be confounded. 
 
At [81], he said: 
It is also important to remember that the issue of fiduciary relationship is usually 
tried by a chancery judge in direct claims of breach of trust or other fiduciary duty 
as a mixed question of law and fact. In the context of defamation it is in this 
instance transposed into a supposed issue of objective fact for a jury as to 
whether a defendant can justify not only his understanding of his relationship 
with the other party, but also the validity of the complaint of a violation of that 
relationship. In such a context there may well be a greater imperative… for 
allowing reality to prevail over technical aspects of corporate law. (emphasis 
added)43 
 
At [186], Laws LJ stressed his ‗emphatic agreement‘ with Auld LJ‘s approach. At 
[188], Sedley LJ said:  
I recognise that there is an asymmetry between the law's longstanding insistence 
on the discrete legal personality of limited liability companies and its willingness to 
lift the veil, as the expression is, in a case like the present. But it is the latter, not 
the former, which accords with common sense and justice when the issue is who a 
solicitor owes his professional duties to. 
 
The difference between these statements and the judgment in Adams is immediately 
obvious. The first statement of Auld LJ, and the statement of Sedley LJ, in particular, 
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clearly echo Cumming-Bruce LJ‘s statement in Re a Company, rather than Slade LJ‘s 
judgment in Adams.  
 
How significant are these statements? As Mayson, French and Ryan observe, the court 
did not refer to Adams in their judgments - nor indeed to Salomon, Re a Company or 
any other case on lifting the veil. Rather, the judgments (and, seemingly, the arguments 
put forward by counsel) were based on the law relating to solicitors‘ fiduciary duties, 
rather than on company law. As such, ‗their remarks may be regarded as per incuriam 
and so not authoritative.‘44 After all, the assertion by Auld LJ that the courts show 
‗readiness‘ to ‗draw back the corporate veil to do justice when common-sense and 
reality demand it‘ is clearly not borne out by Adams or by subsequent cases.  
 
Nevertheless, for three Court of Appeal judges to make such strong remarks is clearly 
significant. Whilst the ruling in Conway does not expressly challenge Salomon or 
Adams, it raises a pertinent question. If a case genuinely concerned with corporate 
personality came before the Court of Appeal (or Supreme Court) today, how would the 
judges react? Put differently – if Adams was to come before the Court of Appeal or the 
Supreme Court today, would Salomon be followed as closely as it was in 1989?45 
Based on the comments in Conway, it seems that at least some Court of Appeal judges 
are keen to (re)widen the categories where the veil should be lifted, perhaps even to 
state, contra Adams, that ‗the court is indeed free to disregard the principle of Salomon 
v Salomon Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 where it considers that justice so requires‘.  
 
4.6.4  Beyond Conway v Ratiu 
Unless or until the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court makes a definitive statement on 
the issue, however, the position in Adams must be seen as authoritative: the court is 
‗not free to disregard the principle of Salomon v Salomon Co Ltd [1897] AC 22, merely 
because it considers that justice so requires‘. This is certainly the approach taken by 
first-instance judges. In Ben Hashem v Ali Shayif (a divorce case in which the court 
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declined to pierce the veil where the husband had allegedly used a company as an alter 
ego), Munby J stated that: 
the court cannot pierce the corporate veil, even where there is no unconnected 
third party involved, merely because it is thought to be necessary in the interests of 
justice. In common with both Toulson J in Yukong Line Ltd of Korea v Rendsberg 
Investments Corporation of Liberia (No 2) [1998] 1 WLR 294 at page 305 and Sir 
Andrew Morritt VC in Trustor at para [21], I take the view that the dicta to that 
effect of Cumming-Bruce LJ in In re a Company [1985] BCLC 333 at pages 337-
338, have not survived what the Court of Appeal said in Cape at page 536…46 
 
Munby J made no reference to the Court of Appeal‘s approach in Conway v Ratiu, 
suggesting that first-instance judges do not see that case as authority that the veil can 
be lifted where this is ―necessary to achieve justice.‖. 
 
4.7 Re a Company: conclusions 
The judgment in Re a Company must therefore be seen as one that was unsound at the 
time, and that has been disapproved by Adams: the court is not able to pierce the 
corporate veil on the catch-all grounds of ―justice‖. With the benefit of hindsight, though, 
one can speculate whether there was any need to do so in the first place. We have 
already noted that, in Wallersteiner, Lord Denning referred to Gilford, and that 
Wallersteiner was the only case expressly referred to by Cumming-Bruce LJ in Re a 
Company.47 Moreover, the frequent use by both the trial judge and by Cumming-Bruce 
LJ of terms such as ―device‖, ―sham‖, ―façade‖ and ―vehicles‖ (see extracts 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9 and 10 above from the judgment in Re a Company) begs the following question. 
Why, in both Re a Company and in Wallersteiner before it, was the veil not lifted for the 
same reason as in Gilford Motor Co Ltd and in Jones v Lipman – namely, on the 
grounds that the corporate structure was being used as a ―sham‖ or ―façade‖ to conceal 
the ―fraud‖ of a shareholder? If Cumming-Bruce had taken such an approach, Re a 
Company might still be good law. The answer to the question is, perhaps, because the 
rationale for lifting the veil on the grounds of ―fraud‖ was at that point relatively 
undeveloped. The catalyst for its development would be a 1992 case which continues to 
                                                          
46
 [2008] EWHC 2380 (Fam) at [160]  
47
 See chapters 4.2 and 4.4 above.  
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perplex. The case of Creasey v Breachwood Motors Ltd,48 and subsequent cases 
examining the ―fraud‖ exception, will be considered in chapter 5. 
 
 
                                                          
48
 [1992] BCC 638 
 64  
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
THE JOKER IN THE PACK: THE CURIOUS CASE OF CREASEY V BREACHWOOD 
MOTORS LTD 
 
5.1 The legacy of Adams v Cape Industries plc  
Following the decision in Adams, the description of Salomon as ‗the unyielding rock‘1 
was apt indeed. Slade LJ‘s crucial statement bears repeating:  
[S]ave in cases which turn on the wording of particular statutes or contracts, the 
court is not free to disregard the principle of Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. Ltd. 
[1897] A.C. 22 merely because it considers that justice so requires.2 
 
As seen in chapter 3, the retreat from the ―single economic unit‖ argument of DHN had 
been all but total. Moreover, the court had rejected the proposition that that NAAC was 
the agent of Cape, the principal, and that Cape should therefore be held liable for the 
judgment against NAAC. As seen in chapter 4, the catch-all ―justice‖ rationale of Re a 
Company had been expressly contradicted. Other than in cases which rested on ‗the 
wording of particular statutes or contracts‘, it seemed that the court recognised only one 
ground for departure from the Salomon principle: 
Quite apart from cases where statute or contract permits a broad interpretation to 
be given to references to members of a group of companies, there is one well-
recognised exception to the rule prohibiting the piercing of "the corporate veil." 
Lord Keith of Kinkel referred to this principle in Woolfson v. Strathclyde Regional 
Council, 1978 S.L.T. 159 in the course of a speech with which Lord Wilberforce, 
Lord Fraser of Tullybelton and Lord Russell of Killowen agreed. With reference to 
the D.H.N. decision [1976] 1 W.L.R. 852 , he said, at p.161: "I have some doubts 
whether in this respect the Court of Appeal properly applied the principle that it is 
appropriate to pierce the corporate veil only where special circumstances exist 
indicating that it is a mere façade concealing the true facts."3 
 
The court saw Jones v Lipman4 (examined in chapter 2.3.3) as an example of the veil 
being lifted on such grounds.5 However, Slade LJ declined to set down any firmer 
guidelines as to when this ―façade‖, ―sham‖ or ―fraud‖ category might arise: 
                                                          
1
 Judgement in Adams was given on 27 July 1989. Lord Templeman‘s famous lecture was given on 15 
November 1989.  
2
 [1990] Ch 433, 536 
3
 [1990] Ch 433, 540 (emphasis added)  
4
 [1962] 1 WLR 832 (ChD) 
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From the authorities cited to us we are left with rather sparse guidance as to the 
principles which should guide the court in determining whether or not the 
arrangements of a corporate group involve a façade within the meaning of that 
word as used by the House of Lords in Woolfson, 1978 S.L.T. 159 . We will not 
attempt a comprehensive definition of those principles.6  
 
He did, however, emphatically reject any argument that the veil should be lifted on 
moral grounds simply because the principles of separate personality and limited liability 
had disadvantaged the tort creditors:7 
[Counsel for Adams] submitted that the court will lift the corporate veil where a 
defendant by the device of a corporate structure attempts to evade (i) limitations 
imposed on his conduct by law; (ii) such rights of relief against him as third parties 
already possess; and (iii) such rights of relief as third parties may in the future 
acquire. Assuming that the first and second of these three conditions will suffice in 
law to justify such a course, neither of them apply in the present case. It is not 
suggested that the arrangements involved any actual or potential illegality or were 
intended to deprive anyone of their existing rights. Whether or not such a course 
deserves moral approval, there was nothing illegal as such in Cape arranging its 
affairs (whether by the use of subsidiaries or otherwise) so as to attract the 
minimum publicity to its involvement in the sale of Cape asbestos in the United 
States of America… we do not accept as a matter of law that the court is entitled to 
lift the corporate veil as against a defendant company which is the member of a 
corporate group merely because the corporate structure has been used so as to 
ensure that the legal liability (if any) in respect of particular future activities of the 
group (and correspondingly the risk of enforcement of that liability) will fall on 
another member of the group rather than the defendant company. Whether or not 
this is desirable, the right to use a corporate structure in this manner is inherent in 
our corporate law. [Counsel for Mr Adams] urged on us that the purpose of the 
operation was in substance that Cape would have the practical benefit of the 
group's asbestos trade in the United States of America without the risks of tortious 
liability. This may be so. However, in our judgment, Cape was in law entitled to 
organise the group's affairs in that manner and (save in the case of A.M.C. to 
which special considerations apply) to expect that the court would apply the 
principle of Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1897] A.C. 22 in the ordinary way.8 
 
In short, Salomon had seemingly regained the hegemony which it had enjoyed following 
prior to 1966,9 and the scope for departing from Salomon had been greatly restricted.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
5
 [1990] Ch 433, 542 
6
 Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433, 543 
7
 Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433, 543. McGaughey and Crowe reject this position: see 
chapter 1.4. 
8
 [1990] Ch 433, 545 
9
 See chapter 2.3 and 2.4. 
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5.2 An introduction to Creasey v Breachwood Motors Ltd 
In 1992, however, the case of Creasey v Breachwood Motors Ltd10 threatened to widen 
once again the situations where the courts would depart from the Salomon principle. In 
the remainder of this chapter, we examine that case in detail. Although overruled by the 
Court of Appeal in Ord v Belhaven Pubs Ltd,11 Creasey has generated considerable 
discussion and diverse opinions. Some have described the decision as ‗maverick‘ and 
‗confused,‘12 or as ‗rather eclectic‘13 and ‗simply irresolvable in accordance with 
established common law principles.‘14 Others, however, have labelled it as a ‗correct‘ 
decision in spite of ‗wrong‘ reasoning;15 as a ‗sensible and appropriate‘ decision;16 and 
as an ‗equitable and commonsense conclusion‘ to a ‗just and reasonable exercise of the 
court‘s discretion‘17 to lift the veil. Whilst some have ‗commended‘18 the Court of Appeal 
for overruling Creasey in Ord, others have described that decision as ‗a pity.‘19  
 
We will first examine the facts and the judgment, which was given by Richard Southwell 
QC (―Southwell‖). We will then consider the subsequent academic and judicial 
reactions, noting the difficulties in categorising Creasey, and its ultimate overruling by 
the Court of Appeal in Ord. We will then consider further how Creasey stimulated fresh 
debate about when the court might depart from Salomon and lift the veil. In particular, 
we will assess the arguments for a ―Creasey extension‖ to the ―fraud‖ category, and the 
way in which Creasey and subsequent cases have clarified exactly when the 
―traditional‖ ―fraud‖ exception will apply. Finally, we will review some recent 
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 [1992] BCC 638  
11
 [1998] 2 BCLC 447, [1998] BCC 607 
12
 Alan Dignam & John Lowry, Company Law (6th edn, OUP 2010) 41.  
13
 Marc Moore, ‗“A temple built on faulty foundations‖: piercing the corporate veil and the legacy of 
Salomon v Salomon‘ [2006] JBL 180, 184 
14
 ibid 202 
15
 Cheong Ann Png, ‗Lifting the veil of Incorporation: Creasey v Breachwood Motors: a right decision with 
the wrong reasons‘ (1999) 20(4) Co Law 122, 124 
16
 Daniel Bromilow, ‗Creasey v Breachwood Motors: mistaken identity leads to untimely death‘ (1998) Co 
Law 19(7) 198 
17
 Stephen Griffin, Company Law: Fundamental Principles (4th edn, Pearson 2006), 26-27 
18
 Bill Maughan & Stephen Copp, ‗Piercing the Corporate Veil‘ (1998) 148(6846) NLJ 938, 940  
19
 Bromilow (n 16) 201 
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developments, before concluding with an assessment of Creasey‘s overall legacy on 
the debate about Salomon and judicial veil-lifting.  
 
5.3 Creasey: the facts  
The facts of Creasey were as follows. Breachwood Welwyn Ltd (―Welwyn‖) operated a 
garage, and employed Mr Creasey as a general manager. The garage operated from 
premises owned by Breachwood Motors Ltd (―Motors‖). Welwyn and Motors had the 
same two directors and shareholders, Mr Ford and Mr Seaman. Motors operated similar 
businesses elsewhere.  
 
In March 1988, Creasey was dismissed by Welwyn. In June 1988, he sued Welwyn for 
wrongful dismissal. In November 1988, Welwyn ceased trading. The following day, 
Motors took over Welwyn‘s business. Motors took over all of Welywn‘s assets (free of 
any consideration) and paid all of Welwyn‘s then creditors, but left no funds available to 
meet Creasey‘s claim, should it succeed. Motors continued to operate the business, at 
the same premises and under the same business name. In March 1991, Creasey 
obtained judgment for damages of £61,910.27 in default against Welwyn. Meanwhile, 
the registrar had given notice to Welwyn that it would be struck off the register and 
dissolved, which took effect on 11 June 1991. Creasey successfully sought an order 
that Motors be substituted as defendants, and therefore made liable for the judgment 
debt. Motors appealed. The appeal was heard by Southwell, sitting as a deputy High 
Court judge. Creasey argued that Ford and Seaman had deliberately transferred all of 
Welywn‘s assets to Motors, leaving him with a worthless claim against a defendant with 
no assets. He argued that the court should therefore lift the veil and hold Motors liable 
for Welwyn‘s debt to Creasey. This argument was accepted by Southwell, to whose 
judgment we now turn.  
 
5.4 Creasey: the judgment  
In rejecting the appeal, Southwell confirmed that Motors should be substituted as 
defendant to Creasey‘s action. One might note, at this stage, that Creasey did not press 
for Ford and Seaman to be held personally liable for the judgment debt against Welwyn, 
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nor did Southwell countenance this step. Strictly speaking, therefore, Southwell‘s ruling 
deviates from the principle in The Albazero, that companies in the same group are not 
liable for each other‘s debts. Indeed, Southwell specifically referred to a need to prevent 
the ‗Breachwood group‘ from evading its contingent liabilities to Creasey.20  Having said 
that, the principle in The Albazero itself derives from Salomon, and therefore 
Southwell‘s judgment can in turn be considered as a deviation from Salomon. We need 
of course only consider those parts which deal with the corporate veil argument.  Direct 
quotations from the judgment are indented and numbered.  
 
Southwell noted that counsel for Creasey, Mr Behar (―Behar‖) had argued that the veil 
should be lifted because the corporate structure was being used as a sham to evade 
legal obligations – more precisely, that Motors was being used as a vehicle to evade 
Welwyn‘s (contingent) legal obligations to Mr Creasey. Behar had cited the cases of 
Gilford and Jones in support. Southwell noted that the facts in Creasey were different, 
since 
Motors was already in existence and carrying on its own business, and the 
―stratagem‖, if there was one, involved the transfer of the relevant business to 
Motors.21 (1)  
 
Southwell also noted that Behar had cited Re a Company [1985] BCLC 333 in which, as 
seen in chapter 4, the Court of Appeal had  
pierce[d] the corporate veil in order to achieve justice.22 (2) 
 
Southwell quoted from Cumming-Bruce LJ‘s judgment in that case:  
―In our view the cases before and after Wallersteiner v Moir [1974] 1 WLR 991 
show that the court will use its powers to pierce the corporate veil if it is necessary 
to achieve justice irrespective of the legal efficacy of the corporate structure under 
consideration. As Lord Denning MR said at p. 1013 in the Wallersteiner case, the 
companies there identified were distinct legal entities and the principles of 
Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 prima facie applied. But only prima 
facie…‖23 (3) 
 
Southwell‘s next statement, as shall be seen, has stimulated some debate:  
                                                          
20
 [1992] BCC 638, 647 
21
 [1992] BCC 638, 646 
22
 [1992] BCC 638, 646 
23
 [1992] BCC 638, 646; quoting from Re a Company [1985] BCLC 333, 337-8 
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The power of the court to lift the corporate veil exists. The problem for a judge of 
first instance is to decide whether the particular case before the court is one in 
which that power should be exercised, recognising that this is a strong power 
which can be exercised to achieve justice where its exercise is necessary for that 
purpose, but which, misused, would be likely to cause not inconsiderable 
injustice.24  (4) 
 
He then considered two cases which Behar had not cited. The first was Woolfson: 
Southwell observed that, in that case, (as seen in chapter 3), Lord Keith had cast doubt 
upon DHN. The second was Adams. Southwell noted that the court had declined to give 
a ‗comprehensive definition‘ of the principles the court should follow when ascertaining 
whether or not the arrangements of a group constitute a ―facade‖.25 He also remarked 
that, in Adams, the Court of Appeal had  
rejected the submission that the veil could be pierced where a defendant by the 
device of a corporate structure attempts to evade ―such rights of relief as third 
parties may in the future acquire... the veil could [only] be pierced where the 
defendant by the device of a corporate structure attempts to evade, ―(1) 
limitations imposed on his conduct by law; (2) such rights of relief against him as 
third parties already possess …‖26 (5)  
 
However, Southwell maintained that the facts in Creasey were  
very different from those in Woolfson and Adams.27 (6) 
 
The rulings in those cases should therefore not bar the piercing of the veil in Creasey,  
in which the transfer of assets from Welwyn of Motors would otherwise enable 
the Breachwood group owned by Mr Ford and Mr Seaman to evade 
responsibility for the contingent liabilities to Mr Creasey for breach of his contract 
of employment.28 (7)   
 
 For Southwell,  
The most important factor [was] that Mr Ford and Mr Seaman, and through them 
Motors, themselves deliberately ignored the separate corporate personalities of 
Welwyn and Motors, and did so with the benefit of the advice of the solicitors 
acting for Welwyn and Motors. Nothing [...] could justify their conduct in 
deliberately shifting Welwyn‘s assets and business into Motors in total disregard 
                                                          
24
 [1992] BCC 638, 646-7 
25
 [1992] BCC 638, 647, quoting from Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433, 543 (see chapter 5.1 
above) 
26
 [1992] BCC 638, 647, quoting from Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433, 544 (see chapter 5.1 
above) 
27
 [1992] BCC 638, 647 
28
 [1992] BCC 638, 647 
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of their duties as directors and shareholders, not least the duties created by 
Parliament as a protection to all creditors of a company.29 (8) 
 
He was critical of the fact that Welwyn  
was not put into liquidation. As a subsisting company it was entitled to retain its 
business and assets, so that they might be available to pay a dividend however 
small to such of Welwyn's creditors as Motors decided not to pay. Mr Ford and 
Mr Seaman decided instead to remove the business and assets of Welwyn to 
Motors, and, realising that the business could not be carried on satisfactorily 
unless Welwyn's trade creditors were paid, paid all their then actual creditors, but 
left Mr Creasey facing a defendant without assets. They did so in full knowledge 
of Mr Creasey's claim30. (9) 
 
Southwell commented that, on the evidence before him,  
the inference could readily be drawn that [...] Mr Ford and Mr Seaman acted in 
the way they did [...] in order to ensure that Mr Creasey if he succeeded in his 
claim would not be able to recover anything.31 (10) 
 
However, he considered it  
wrong to draw so strongly adverse an inference at this stage on only the 
affidavit evidence.32 (11)  
 
Nevertheless, he maintained that it was appropriate for the court to lift the veil and 
hold Motors liable for Welwyn‘s outstanding liability to Creasey. Notwithstanding 
objections from Motors,  
the central point [was] that the business and assets should have remained with 
Welwyn unless and until Motors bought them by paying a proper price for 
them.33 (12) 
 
Southwell then went on to consider three specific reasons which Motors had 
advanced as to why the veil should not be lifted. Firstly, Motors had argued that it was 
not a sham company like those in Gilford and Jones, but a solid company with its own 
businesses; and the assets were not transferred to defeat a contractual liability which 
Welwyn would otherwise have paid, but because Welwyn was genuinely insolvent 
before the transfer took place. According to Southwell, though,   
                                                          
29
 [1992] BCC 638, 647-8 
30
 [1992] BCC 638, 648 
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 [1992] BCC 638, 648 
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 [1992] BCC 638, 648 
33
 [1992] BCC 638, 648 
 71  
 
the facts remain[ed] that Welwyn had assets of over £70,000 and a subsisting 
business, that Mr Creasey [was] the only unpaid creditor, and that he [was] now 
faced with a dissolved company having no assets at all.34 (13) 
 
Motors‘ second argument was that, if Welwyn had been wound up, Creasey would have 
had a disputed claim against a company in liquidation. To permit him to enforce the 
entire judgment against a solvent company, Motors, was inequitable, since that would 
put him in a better position. Southwell found this argument persuasive, and therefore set 
aside the original judgment and damages assessment, noting that there   
 
was and is an arguable defence to the [initial] action for wrongful dismissal35 (14) 
 
Thirdly, Motors argued that to substitute Motors as defendant was wrong and unjust, 
since Creasey was already entitled to restore Welwyn to the register and then petition 
for its winding up, or seek an action in tort against Motors, Ford and Seaman. In 
response, Southwell asked whether it was  
right to use this route [i.e. substituting Motors as defendant] so as to achieve 
justice between the parties36. (15) 
 
However, since Creasey was legally aided, and in view of the costs of the actions 
referred to by Motors, Southwell  
doubt[ed] very much whether in view of the sums in issue justice [could] be done 
for Mr Creasey if Motors were not substituted37 (16) 
 
Having dealt with these submissions by Motors, Southwell closed by considering 
whether he should simply allow Motors‘ appeal and leave Creasey to pursue his rights 
against Ford, Seaman and Motors. He closed as follows:38  
Because of the conduct of Motors as directed by Mr Ford and Mr Seaman, justice 
would not be done if Motors were not to be held to be directly liable to Mr Creasey 
for breach of his employment contract, if there was a breach, which has yet to be 
decided. (17) 
 
To put the parties to all the expense probably of two sets of proceedings (one by 
Mr Creasey against Motors and the two directors, and the other by the liquidator of 
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 [1992] BCC 638, 648 
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 [1992] BCC 638, 651 
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 [1992] BCC 638, 649  
37
 [1992] BCC 638, 649 
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Welwyn against the same persons) would be unjust to Mr Creasey and would 
involve substantial unnecessary expense for the defendants. (18) 
 
I cannot ignore the fact that Mr Creasey is funded by the legal aid board. This is an 
additional factor pointing to the need to lift the corporate veil, and to ensure that 
the remaining issues are decided in the present action, and against the party or 
parties with primary responsibilities. (19) 
 
 
5.5 Creasey: academic reactions 
Writing in 1992, Lowry commented that the Creasey decision ‗does not appear to fit 
neatly into any of the established categories where the courts have been prepared to 
pierce the veil.‘39 This comment is surely correct. Some of Southwell‘s language is that 
of the ―sham‖ exception to the Salomon principle. Elsewhere, he uses the language of 
the ―justice‖ approach, which was taken in Re a Company but then categorically 
rejected in Adams. At still other points, his decision seems to be driven by a desire to 
remedy or penalise a breach of duty on the part of Ford and Seaman, the directors of 
Welwyn, in transferring assets to Motors free of consideration. Unsurprisingly, therefore 
academics are divided about how to categorise the case. 
 
5.5.1 Should Creasey be categorised as a “fraud” case?  
Some writers place Creasey into the same category as Gilford and Jones. They 
maintain that, in Creasey, Southwell lifted the veil on the basis that Motors was being 
used as a ―facade‖ or ―sham‖, in order to evade a legal obligation. Such writers include 
Farrar and Hannington (writing in 1998, seemingly before Ord v Belhaven Pubs Ltd was 
decided),40 Maughan and Copp (writing in 1998, following the Ord decision),41 
Pennington (2001),42 and Talbot (2008).43  
 
These writers do not generally elaborate on why they categorise Creasey in this way. It 
is possible that they do so based on the allusion to a ‗stratagem‘ in extract 1 above, or 
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because counsel for Creasey had pleaded the case in these terms. If the case is to be 
considered a ―fraud‖ case, then it is clearly different from both Gilford and Jones. In 
those cases, the defendants set up new companies in order to evade their obligations. 
In Creasey, by contrast, and as Southwell noted (see extract 1), Motors already existed 
as a trading company, and any ―sham‖ involved the transfer of Welwyn‘s business to 
Motors. (Talbot incorrectly states that Motors was a ‗newly formed company... set up 
specifically to hold the assets [of Welwyn]‘.44) However, as Daniel Bromilow observes,45 
there is a more fundamental reason why the case should not be considered as a ―fraud‖ 
case along the lines of Gilford and Jones. Southwell himself declined, on the basis of 
affidavit evidence alone, to infer that Ford and Seaman had acted as they did in a 
deliberate attempt to deprive Creasey of the chance to recover any money, should his 
claim succeed (see extract 11). In other words, Ford and Seaman lacked the necessary 
fraudulent or improper intention required for the fraud exception to apply. This weighs 
against those who interpret Creasey as a ―fraud‖ case. Payne and Png nevertheless 
use Creasey to build important arguments about the ―fraud‖ exception to the rule in 
Salomon, to which we return in chapter 5.7.2 below. 
 
5.5.2 Should Creasey be categorised as a “justice” case?  
The majority of commentators categorise Creasey as a case in which the veil was lifted 
―in the interests of justice‖, in order to remedy the apparent injustice done to Mr Creasey 
by the transfer of assets from Welwyn to Motors, which left him with a worthless claim. 
This view is taken by Payne (1997),46 Grier (1998),47 Griffin (2006),48 Moore (2006),49 
Lowry and Reisberg (2009),50 Girvin et al (2010),51 and Sealy and Worthington (2010).52 
Such a view is eminently understandable. There are references to piercing the veil to 
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achieve ―justice‖ in extracts 2, 4, 15, 16, 17 and 18 above. The references to ―justice‖ in 
extracts 17 and 18, which were closing, summary statements, seem particularly 
significant when deciding how to categorise the case. In extract 19, moreover, 
Southwell said that the fact that Creasey was funded by the Legal Aid Board was an 
additional reason to lift the veil - presumably because this was the best means of 
ensuring justice for someone with limited funds, in contrast to forcing him to restore 
Welwyn to the register and then initiate fresh proceedings under the insolvency 
legislation. It also seems significant that, although Southwell discussed Adams of his 
own volition (it had not been cited to him by Behar), he did not mention Slade LJ‘s clear 
statement that the court should not disregard Salomon simply because ‗it considers that 
justice so requires.‘  
 
If Southwell did indeed lift the veil on the basis that ‗justice so required‘, then he was 
quite clearly out of step with Adams. Bromilow, however, argues that those who 
interpret the decision in ―justice‖ terms do so incorrectly, apparently based on the 
headnote to the report of the case, and on Southwell‘s statement (at extract 4 above), 
that  
The power of the court to lift the corporate veil exists... this is a strong power which 
can be exercised to achieve justice where its exercise is necessary for that 
purpose but which, misused, would be likely to cause not inconsiderable injustice. 
 
Bromilow argues that, when read in its immediate context, this statement  
is not intended to be a statement of general principle as to when the court should 
exercise the power to lift the veil, but merely a commentary on the existence of 
the power to do so, and an observation that there is no general principle as to 
when this power should be exercised.53  
 
Whilst Bromilow‘s argument about the immediate context of the extract may have some 
force, it does not seem adequately to take into account the other references to ―justice‖ 
in Southwell‘s judgment, particularly those in his concluding statements. It is submitted, 
therefore, there are good grounds for categorising Creasey as a decision in which, 
contra Adams, the veil was lifted ‗in the interests of justice‘.  
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5.5.3 Should Creasey be categorised differently? 
Whilst Bromilow appears to be misguided in rejecting the ―justice‖ label outright, he 
nevertheless makes an important point about how else Creasey might be categorised. 
He draws particular attention to extracts 7, 8 and 12 above. In these extracts, Southwell 
stated that ‗the most important factor‘, indeed ‗the central point‘, was that Welwyn‘s 
directors transferred the company‘s assets to Motors without consideration, in breach of 
their duties as directors. In doing so, they themselves deliberately ignored the separate 
personalities of the two companies. As Bromilow puts it:  
Welwyn's corporate veil was pierced, therefore, not because its assets had been 
transferred to Breachwood Motors in a deliberate attempt to defraud Mr Creasey, 
but because the transfer was a breach of the directors' fiduciary duties to Welwyn 
and was itself inconsistent with the existence of Welwyn's corporate veil. Mr Ford 
and Mr Seaman had acted in breach of their fiduciary duties to Welwyn since 
they had caused it to divest itself of all its assets. As directors, they were under a 
duty to use their powers for the benefit of the company, and there are no 
occasions on which it can be in the best interests of a company to give away all 
its assets for no consideration.54 
 
Bromilow therefore places Creasey into a new category of exceptions to the Salomon 
principle, which he dubs as ―the Creasey extension‖ to the fraud category. For the veil to 
be lifted, a claimant need only prove that directors have shifted assets from the 
company in breach of their duties, in a manner tantamount to ignoring the corporate 
veil. The claimant need not prove intention to defraud.  
 
We assess the merits of ―the Creasey extension‖ in chapter 5.7.1 below. For now, we 
may note that Bromilow‘s categorisation of the case takes seriously what Southwell 
himself stated to be ‗the central point‘ and ‗the most important factor‘. On the other 
hand, as noted earlier, numerous extracts of the judgment appear to place the case into 
the ―justice‖ category.  
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5.5.4 Creasey: academic reactions: summary  
We have seen that Creasey does not fit into the category of the ―fraud‖ exception to the 
Salomon principle, as understood in the classic cases of Gilford and Jones. Rather, 
there are good grounds for categorising it either as a case in which the veil was lifted in 
the interests of justice, or as a new kind of case where the veil was lifted in order to 
remedy a transfer of assets made by directors in breach of their duties. There are 
extracts in the judgment which place it into either of those categories. In short, those 
academics who describe the judgment as ‗confused‘ and ‗eclectic‘ are surely right to do 
so. This has not prevented Creasey triggering important discussions about judicial veil-
lifting. We will now survey how Creasey has been treated by the courts.  
 
5.6 Creasey: subsequent judicial treatment  
5.6.1 The Tjaskemolen (No.1) (August 1996)55  
Creasey was first mentioned in the courts in this shipping case. A ship was owned by 
the Bayland group of companies. Another company, Profer, leased the ship. When 
Bayland failed to provide documentation relating to the lease, Profer commenced 
proceedings, and attempted to seize the ship as security for their action. Bayland 
purported to provide security to release the ship and to transfer it to another group 
company, such that it could no longer provide the ship as security to Profer. Profer 
argued that this purported transfer was not a genuine transaction for valuable 
consideration made in good faith, but a device to avoid providing security to Profer for 
their claim, and to avoid having to satisfy any damages which might be awarded. The 
similarities to Creasey are clear. Profer argued that the transaction was a sham or a 
façade, and therefore asked the court to rule that Bayland itself retained the beneficial 
ownership of the ship.  
 
It was held that the alleged transfer of the ship had indeed been a sham to prevent the 
seizure of the ship by Profer. The court therefore ruled that Bayland, rather than the 
alleged transferee group company, remained the ship‘s beneficial owners. Clarke J 
cited Creasey (in particular, the wording in extracts 8 to 12 above) as a precedent for 
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lifting the veil where one company was stripped of its assets in order to defeat a 
potential claim. He described Creasey as ‗an example of piercing the veil, where assets 
are deliberately, transferred from A to B in the knowledge that to do so, will defeat a 
creditor's claim or potential claim, even if that is not proved to be the purpose of doing 
so.‘56 He also noted that Southwell „would have regarded the case as even stronger if 
the purpose of the transaction was to defeat the creditor‘s claim,‘ thus acknowledging 
Southwell‘s reluctance to ascribe dishonest intentions to Ford and Seaman on the basis 
of the affidavit evidence alone. Clarke J therefore interpreted Creasey along the same 
lines as Bromilow.57  
 
5.6.2 Yukong Line Ltd. of Korea v Rendsburg Investments Corporation of Liberia 
 and Others (No. 2) (September 1997)58  
The claimant (―Yukong‖) brought an action against the defendant (―Rendsburg‖) for 
breach of contract. Rendsburg transferred funds to another company, Ladidi, on the day 
the contract was repudiated. Those funds might have been used to meet any liability to 
the claimant. Subsequently, Rendsburg‘s own bank account was closed. Yukong 
discovered that the shares in both Rendsburg and Ladidi were effectively owned by the 
same individual and members of his family. Yukong sought to join both that individual, 
and Ladidi, as parties to the action. The court was therefore asked to pierce the veil 
both between Rendsburg and its shareholder, and between Rendsburg and another 
company in the same group. Counsel for Yukong relied upon both Creasey and The 
Tjaskemolen to argue that, where it can be proven that assets have been deliberately 
transferred out of a company by a shareholder-director in order to defeat potential 
claims against the company, the court may pierce the veil and hold him personally liable 
for that company‘s liabilities.  
 
Toulson J noted that counsel for Rendsburg criticised Southwell‘s reasoning in Creasey, 
yet he himself did not comment on this, as he felt that the facts before him were 
materially different. In the case before him, there had been merely a transfer of funds, 
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whereas in Creasey, there had been a transfer of an entire undertaking from Welwyn to 
Motors. In his summary of Southwell‘s decision, however, he quoted verbatim from 
extract 8 above – as had Clarke J in The Tjaskemolen, and as does Bromilow (see 
above). In both of these cases, therefore, Creasey was characterised as a case in 
which the veil was lifted in order to remedy or penalise the conduct of directors who 
transferred the assets of one company to another, with the effect, intentional or 
otherwise, of defeating the claims of (potential) creditors. However, Creasey‟s judicial 
influence was short-lived, since it would shortly be overruled in Ord.   
 
5.6.3 Ord v Belhaven Pubs Ltd (February 1998) 59 
In 1991, Mr and Mrs Ord sued Belhaven Pubs Ltd (―Belhaven‖) for misrepresentation 
and breach of warranty arising out of the purchase of a lease of a pub. Belhaven 
counterclaimed for unpaid rent. Belhaven was a wholly owned subsidiary of Ascot 
Holdings plc (―Holdings‖), as was Ascot Estates Ltd (―Estates‖). In 1992, the group was 
restructured in response to economic recession. As part of this restructuring, the hotels 
in Belhaven‘s name were transferred to Holdings, whilst Estates took over Belhaven‘s 
trading operations.  Belhaven then effectively ceased trading but remained the legal 
owner of the pub leased to the Ords. In 1997, the Ords applied for leave to substitute 
Holdings and Estates as defendants in the action, on the grounds that Belhaven itself 
had become a mere shell with insufficient assets to pay any damages which might be 
awarded to the Ords.  
 
At first instance the application was granted by Alton J. She accepted that the inter-
group transfers were made for bona fide commercial reasons and without any devious 
motives. However, she also stated that the reorganisation was made ‗without any 
regard as to where profits or losses arose or fell‘ and that ‗the boundaries between the 
companies were not simply blurred but disregarded altogether.‘60 She then went on to 
consider whether, in the circumstances, it would be appropriate to lift the veil.  
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In order for this to happen, she said, the court needed to be satisfied that the corporate 
structure was being fraudulently used as a facade for actions which were otherwise 
unlawful.  
 
In this context, she referred to Southwell‘s decision in Creasey. However, she 
distinguished the actions of the Ascot group from those of the Breachwood group. In the 
scenario before her, there was no ‗blatant asset stripping of one subsidiary in favour of 
another for no consideration whatsoever‘; rather, the transfers were, at least on paper, 
for valuable consideration.61 Nevertheless, she concluded that the directors of Holdings 
had  
deliberately ignored the separate corporate identity, acted solely in the interests 
of the group and at the behest of the Holdings in so doing and thus deliberately 
and totally disregarded their duties to creditors in general and the Plaintiffs in 
particular.62 
 
Accordingly, she held that the court was 
justified in lifting the veil and treating Holdings who appear to be the controlling 
mind for both these subsidiaries as liable for this contingent debt [to the Ords].63 
 
She found it  
unjust to permit the Defendant and/or those who control it to take advantage of it 
to avoid a contingent liability which (assuming the claim is proved) the Defendant 
company would appear to have been capable of meeting but for the [...] 
transfers. To permit such a potential windfall as a consequence of taking of 
action by the group for the purposes of its own commercial interests would in my 
view be unjust.64 
 
Her reasoning bears clear similarities to that of Southwell in Creasey, who found it 
unjust for Ford and Seaman to take the benefit of the transfer of assets from Welwyn to 
Motors, whilst at the same time leaving no assets to meet the contingent claim of Mr 
Creasey (see extracts 7, 8, 9, 12, 13 and 17 above).  
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Accordingly, just as Southwell had lifted the veil and had allowed Motors to be 
substituted as defendant in the action against Welwyn, so Alton J allowed Holdings to 
be substituted as defendant in the current action.  
 
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeal overturned Alton J‘s decision, ruling that the Ords 
should bring their claim against the original defendant, Belhaven. Hobhouse LJ, giving 
the leading judgment, said that Alton J had been wrong to lift the veil. He said that 
nothing improper had been done in the restructuring of the Belhaven group, nor was 
there any evidence that the directors had breached their duties to the creditors. Nor was 
there any case for saying that the corporate veil had been used as a sham or facade for 
any such improper behaviour. Rather, the restructuring was  
just the ordinary trading of a group of companies under circumstances where... 
the company is in law entitled to organise the group‘s affairs in the manner that it 
does; and to expect that the court should apply the principles of Salomon v 
Salomon in the ordinary way.65 
 
Hobhouse LJ then commented on Creasey. He suggested that Southwell had adopted 
reasoning similar to that of Alton J, and therefore specifically overruled it as ‗a wrong 
adoption of the principle of piercing the corporate veil‘.66 Brooke J and Sir John 
Balcombe agreed with him. The latter added that, if the group restructuring had been 
handled in an improper or fraudulent manner, there were adequate provisions within 
insolvency legislation to deal with this, notably s. 423 Insolvency Act 1986 (transactions 
defrauding creditors).67   
 
5.6.3.1  Ord v Belhaven Pubs Ltd: criticism 
Hobhouse LJ‘s decision to overrule Creasey has been criticised by several 
commentators.68 It has been pointed out that he overlooked the significant factual 
differences between Creasey and Ord. In Creasey, there was no consideration given for 
the transfer of assets from Welwyn to Motors. In Ord, however, Hobhouse LJ himself 
confirmed that valuable consideration was given for the transfer of assets from 
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Belhaven to Holdings and Estates.69 He also clearly stated that ‗nothing improper‘ had 
been done by the ‗group or the companies in the group or their directors.‘70 In Creasey, 
however, Southwell charged Ford and Seaman with breaching their duties as directors 
in allowing the gratuitous transfer of assets from Welwyn to Motors (see extract 8 
above). Whilst there were justifiable commercial reasons for the inter-group transfers in 
Ord, this was not the case in Creasey. The facts two cases were therefore different, and 
so the Court of Appeal should arguably have distinguished Creasey, rather than 
overruling it. On the other hand, the Court of Appeal was perhaps reluctant to 
distinguish it, since this would have given implicit judicial recognition to what was 
undoubtedly a confused decision.   
 
Given the brevity of Hobhouse LJ‘s comments on Creasey, it is unclear how he 
categorised the case. Clearly, he did not consider it to be a ―fraud‖ case along the lines 
of Gilford or Jones, for otherwise he would not have overruled it. It also seems clear that 
he did not view, and certainly did not approve, Creasey as a case where the veil had 
been pierced in order to remedy or penalise a transfer of assets made without 
consideration which breached the directors‘ duties. (Indeed, Hobhouse LJ did not 
consider there to have been any asset-stripping in Creasey.71 This assessment is 
surprising, to say the least, in the light of extracts 8, 9, 12 and 13 of Southwell‘s 
judgment.) Bromilow, in particular, laments the fact that the court did not properly 
consider ―the Creasey extension‖, the merits of which we will consider in chapter 5.7.1 
below. It seems most likely, then, that Hobhouse LJ viewed Creasey as a case in which 
the veil had been lifted in order to achieve justice – and, following Adams, overruled it 
accordingly.  
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5.6.4 Kensington International Limited v Republic of the Congo (formerly the 
 People's Republic of the Congo) (November 2005)72  
The Republic of Congo conducted sales of oil through companies set up to conceal the 
identity of the Congo as the real seller and the real recipient of the sale proceeds. The 
corporate structures were used to ‗avoid… attachment of the oil or of the proceeds of 
sale by existing creditors of the Congo in circumstances where it was known that the 
creditors were taking aggressive action with a view to enforcing the Congo‘s debts.‘73 
The court lifted the veil so as to make the Congolese government directly liable for such 
attachments. Cooke J briefly alluded to Creasey as an example of a case where the 
court went ‗beyond the bounds of proper application of the principles, by ignoring the 
need for dishonesty where assets are disposed of which defeat the claims of 
creditors.‘74 This suggests that he saw Creasey as a misconstrued ―sham‖ case, in 
which the veil had been lifted to penalise the disposal of assets to defeat creditors‘ 
claims, but without finding the necessary dishonest motive. This has implications for 
Bromilow‘s arguments for ―the Creasey extension‖, which we consider below.  
 
5.6.5 Creasey: subsequent judicial treatment: summary  
In The Tjaskemolen and in Yukong, Creasey was seen as authority for the proposition 
that the veil could be lifted to remedy the deliberate transfer of assets from one 
company to another, where such a transfer had the effect, intentional or otherwise, of 
defeating a creditor‘s claim or potential claim. It is unclear how Hobhouse LJ 
categorised Creasey in Ord, though it seems most likely that he viewed it as a ―justice‖ 
case. In Kensington International, the court seemingly viewed Creasey as a 
misconstrued ―sham‖ case. Altogether, the courts have seemingly found Creasey as 
difficult to classify as the academics.  
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5.7 Creasey and the exceptions to the rule in Salomon v Salomon: further 
 debate 
Given the confused nature of Southwell‘s judgment, it is perhaps unsurprising that there 
is no direct reference to Salomon itself; the only reference to it is in the allusion to the 
Wallersteiner case (extract 3). We have already noted that, technically, the decision in 
Creasey was a deviation from the principle in The Albazero and, by extension, from 
Salomon itself. We have also established that it remains unclear as to exactly why the 
veil was lifted, whether ‗in the interests of justice‘, or to remedy the gratuitous transfer of 
assets made in breach of directors‘ duties. Despite of this lack of clarity, and 
notwithstanding its ultimate overruling in Ord, Creasey has stimulated various 
arguments about when the courts might or should lift the veil. We shall now consider 
some of these arguments.  
 
5.7.1 Daniel Bromilow: the Creasey extension to the “fraud” category 
As noted earlier, Bromilow places Creasey into a new category of exceptions to the 
Salomon principle, which he dubs as ―the Creasey extension‖ to the fraud category. In 
order for the veil to be lifted, a claimant need only prove that directors have shifted 
assets from the company in breach of their duties, in a manner tantamount to ignoring 
the corporate veil. The claimant need not prove an intention to defraud the creditor.75 
Since intention is difficult to prove, this would clearly benefit claimants such as Mr 
Creasey.  
 
Bromilow advances powerful arguments for ―the Creasey extension‖. If a claimant has a 
prior claim on the company‘s assets, and those assets are transferred to another 
company free of consideration, the directors‘ motivations for making this transfer are 
irrelevant. Where the transferor and transferee company are owned and controlled by 
the same people, the transferee company is imputed with their knowledge of the details 
of the transfer which render it a breach of their fiduciary duties. This operates to reduce 
the claims of the transferee company to the assets, as against the claims of the 
claimant. Moreover, under equitable principles, a benefit cannot pass without a 
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corresponding burden. If Ford and Seaman transferred assets from Welwyn to Motors 
free of consideration, and therefore rejected the burden of separate corporate identities, 
it was inequitable for them to benefit from those separate entities and hide assets from 
Creasey. As Bromilow writes, ‗If the director-shareholders have themselves pierced the 
corporate veil by making the gratuitous transaction, why should the court not follow 
them through the existing breach in the veil?‘76 
 
Bromilow considers various objections to ―the Creasey extension‖ - principally, that a 
claimant has an existing remedy, namely to proceed with the action against the 
transferor company, obtain judgment against it, and then place it into liquidation. The 
liquidator can then use, say, s. 238 Insolvency Act 1986 (transactions at an undervalue) 
to recover the value of the assets transferred to the transferee company, following 
which the claimant could recover the value of the claim against the transferor company. 
Sir John Balcombe‘s judgment, in Ord, expressed precisely this view – that insolvency 
legislation should be used to remedy conduct of the kind complained of in Creasey and 
Ord.  Bromilow‘s rejoinder, following Southwell‘s words in extract 18, is that existing 
remedies under the insolvency legislation are costly and elaborate. If Creasey himself 
had been forced to rely on insolvency legislation, he would have had to bring an action 
to place Welwyn into liquidation, and then persuade the liquidator to sue Ford and 
Seaman for breach of duty and to sue Motors for the value of the assets it had received 
free of consideration.77 By contrast, ―the Creasey extension‖, as inferred by Bromilow 
from Southwell‘s judgment, was a much quicker and cheaper route to the same end. 
Bromilow therefore laments the demise of Creasey in Ord, and the fact that ―the 
Creasey extension‖ was not properly considered by Hobhouse LJ. On the grounds of 
equity and pragmatism alone, it is difficult to disagree with Bromilow.  
 
However, equity and pragmatism alone do not determine when the veil should be lifted. 
Sir John Balcombe‘s judgment in Ord (which Bromilow does not consider) stipulates, 
albeit briefly, that insolvency legislation should indeed be used to remedy conduct of the 
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kind complained of in Creasey and Ord. We have already noted that in Kensington 
International,78 Creasey was criticised as an example of a case where the court went 
‗beyond the bounds of proper application of the principles, by ignoring the need for 
dishonesty where assets are disposed of which defeat the claims of creditors.‘79 The 
combined effect of these judgments is to nullify Bromilow‘s arguments. On the one 
hand, the veil should not be lifted as an alternative to a claimant pursuing existing 
remedies via the insolvency legislation. On the other hand, for the fraud exception to 
apply, it is necessary for dishonest motives to be present, however difficult these may 
be to ascertain. Creasey cannot therefore be used as a basis for creating a new 
category of exceptions to the rule in Salomon. It has, however, stimulated discussion as 
to when the traditional ―fraud‖ exception will apply, as we will now consider 
 
5.7.2 Jennifer Payne and Cheong Ann Png: clarifying the “fraud” exception  
Jennifer Payne categorises Creasey as a ‗rather suspect‘ decision in which the veil was 
lifted to achieve justice.80 She argues that Southwell should have lifted the veil on the 
basis of ―fraud‖, but did not do so because he misunderstood the category. Extracts 10 
and 11 of Southwell‘s judgment suggest otherwise, namely that Southwell did not apply 
the fraud exception because he refused to infer dishonest intentions on the part of Ford 
and Seaman. Nevertheless, Payne‘s comments on the ―fraud‖ exception are worth 
examining.  
 
Having analysed Jones and Gilford – ‗classic examples of the fraud exception‘81 – 
Payne discusses three aspects of the fraud exception. First, she asserts that an 
element of deception must be present. Secondly, the nature of the legal duty being 
evaded may be relevant. In Jones and Gilford, the legal obligation which the defendants 
tried to evade existed before the respective ―sham‖ companies were set up. In Adams, 
by contrast, the court had affirmed the right to use the corporate structure as a means of 
protection from future or potential liabilities. In order for the fraud exception to apply, 
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therefore, ‗the defendant must intend to deny the [claimant] a pre-existing legal right‘.82 
Finally, Payne considers the timing of the incorporation of the ―sham‖ company. She 
argues that, in Creasey, the ―fraud‖ argument failed because Motors had been 
incorporated prior to the transfer of assets from Welwyn. As seen in extract 1 above, 
Southwell did indeed distinguish Creasey from Jones and Gilford in these terms. (Again, 
though, he did not, for this reason alone, rule out the presence of a ‗stratagem‘; rather, 
he did so because he did not have sufficient evidence of dishonest intention.) However, 
Payne points out that neither Jones nor Gilford make any reference to the timing of 
incorporation. The ratio of both cases was simply that the veil will be pierced where the 
corporate form has been used to evade existing legal obligations. As Payne puts it: ‗To 
try to stretch the cases to say more than that [i.e. that the ―sham‖ company should be 
incorporated after the genesis of the legal obligation] is to distort them. It should be 
irrelevant that the device company is an existing, solid company with its own business, 
as long as it has been used as a tool to effect the fraud.‘83 It is the fraudulent use of the 
corporate vehicle, rather than its formation, that should follow the existence of the legal 
duty being evaded.  
 
Png makes a similar point: ‗What counts is whether [the company] was used as a 
façade at the time of the relevant transactions‘ not whether it was ‗originally 
incorporated with any deceptive intent.‘84 Unlike Payne, Png argues that Southwell‘s 
decision is authority for this proposition,85 whereas Payne argues that Creasey was not 
decided on this basis, but should have been. The differing assessments of two 
prominent academics confirm, yet again, the perplexing nature of Southwell‘s judgment! 
Nevertheless, they are both surely correct to say that it is the use of the corporate 
vehicle to perpetrate fraud which counts, not the timing of incorporation. In the 2001 
case of Trustor AB v Smallbone (No. 2),86 this view was given implicit judicial 
recognition.  
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5.7.2.1 Trustor AB v Smalbone and others (No. 2)  
 
(i) Facts 
Mr Smallbone was the managing director of Trustor AB (―Trustor‖). In 1997, £39 million 
was paid out of Trustor‘s accounts on the signatures of Smallbone and one other 
director, without obtaining the requisite authority from the other directors. £20 million of 
this money was paid to Introcom (International) Ltd (―Introcom‖). Introcom, in turn, paid 
about £400,000 on to Smallbone. Trustor commenced proceedings against Introcom 
and obtained summary judgment. Introcom was ordered to repay money to Trustor, on 
the grounds that it knew that the initial payment was unauthorised. Introcom appealed. 
On appeal, the initial judgment was upheld. It was also found that Introcom was 
controlled by a trust of which Smallbone was the beneficiary, and that the directors were 
nominees acting on Smallbone‘s instructions – and therefore effectively under 
Smallbone‘s control. The judge also found that the payments from Trustor to Introcom 
had been ‗dishonestly‘ effected by Smallbone, without authority, in ‗inexcusable breach 
of his duty as managing director of Trustor.‘87 According to the judge, Introcom was 
merely a ―vehicle‖ which Smallbone used for receiving money from Trustor.88 Trustor 
then applied for Smallbone to be held jointly and severally liable with Introcom on the 
grounds that receipt by Introcom was to be treated as receipt by Smallbone. This would 
of course amount to a piercing of the veil between Introcom (the company) and 
Smallbone (who controlled it). The court was therefore required to determine the 
circumstances in which it could pierce the veil and treat a company‘s receipt as that of 
an individual.  
 
(ii) Judgment 
Counsel for Trustor argued that the case law justified piercing the veil in three 
(potentially overlapping) situations. The first was where the company had been used as 
a façade or sham. The second was there the company had been involved in some 
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impropriety. The third, which Trustor based upon Re a Company [1985] BCLC 333, was 
where it was necessary to do so in the interests of justice. (Creasey was mentioned in 
Trustor‘s skeleton argument but – probably wisely – was not cited in oral 
submissions.89) 
 
Sir Andrew Morritt V-C rejected the second and third propositions. The second 
proposition was ‗too widely stated unless used in conjunction with the first.‘ Companies 
were ‗often involved in improprieties…. But it would make undue inroads into the 
principle of Salomon‟s case if an impropriety not linked to the use of the company 
structure to avoid or conceal liability for that impropriety was enough.‘90 He correctly 
pointed out that the third proposition was inconsistent with Slade LJ‘s statement, in 
Adams, that Salomon was not to be ignored by the court ‗merely because… justice so 
requires‘.91  
 
He did, however, recognise the first proposition:  
In my judgment the court is entitled to ―pierce the corporate veil‖ and recognise 
the receipt of the company as that of the individual(s) in control of it if the 
company was used as a device or facade to conceal the true facts thereby 
avoiding or concealing any liability of those individual(s).92 
 
He therefore ruled that  
Introcom was a device or facade in that it was used as the vehicle for the receipt 
of the money of Trustor. Its use was improper as it was the means by which Mr 
Smallbone committed unauthorised and inexcusable breaches of his duty as a 
director of Trustor.93 
 
Accordingly, it was appropriate to pierce the veil and hold that the receipt of Trustor‘s 
money by Introcom was also the receipt by Smallbone, who should therefore be held 
jointly and severally liable for Introcom‘s initial judgment debt.  
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(iii) Commentary 
It is useful to analyse Trustor in the light of the three aspects of the fraud exception 
discussed by Payne.94 Firstly, an element of deception was present – the court found 
that Smallbone had not merely breached his duties as Trustor‘s director, but had also 
acted dishonestly. (By contrast, in Creasey, Southwell held that Ford and Seaman had 
breached their duties, but declined to infer dishonest motives.) Secondly, the fact that 
the payments made to Introcom were unauthorised meant that the liability to repay 
Trustor was real and extant, not merely potential or speculative. Finally, the timing of the 
incorporation of Introcom was irrelevant. Introcom had existed prior to the unauthorised 
payments. This contrasted with the situations in Gilford and Jones, where the ―sham‖ 
companies were formed after the respective undesired legal obligations had arisen. This 
―timing‖ point did not deter Sir Andrew Morritt V-C from lifting the veil; indeed, he did not 
even mention it. Trustor therefore confirms the arguments of Payne and Png: the veil 
will be pierced on the grounds of ―sham‖ or ―fraud‖ whenever the company is used as a 
façade to evade legal obligations, regardless of whether the company was formed 
before or after those obligations arose.  
 
5.8 Recent developments  
More recently, this has been confirmed by Munby J in Ben Hashem v Ali Shayif95 
(alluded to in chapter 4.6.4). In a review of the circumstances where the court will pierce 
the veil, he observed that 
if the court is to pierce the veil it is necessary to show both control of the company 
by the wrongdoer(s) and impropriety, that is, (mis)use of the company by them as 
a device or façade to conceal their wrongdoing… a company can be a façade 
even though it was not originally incorporated with any deceptive intent. The 
question is whether it is being used as a façade at the time of the relevant 
transaction(s).96 
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Munby J‘s exposition has been quoted in several recent first instance decisions, 
including by Flaux J in Linsen International Ltd v Humpuss Sea Transport Pte Ltd.97 
Flaux J declined to pierce the veil so as to enable the claimants to bring freezing 
injunctions against both the first defendant, and other defendants to whom the first 
defendant had transferred assets. For good measure, he noted that Creasey – which 
had been cited by the claimants in argument – had been wrongly decided and 
disapproved of in Ord. As at the date of writing,98 this remains the most recent mention 
of Creasey in an English court.   
   
5.9 Creasey and beyond: summary and conclusions  
Following the emphatic affirmation of Salomon in Adams, Creasey injected fresh life into 
the debate about judicial veil-lifting. Both academics and subsequent judges have 
disagreed about how the case should be categorised. Creasey has stimulated important 
arguments, later given implicit judicial recognition, about when the ―fraud‖ exception to 
the Salomon principle should apply: namely, when the corporate structure is dishonestly 
used to evade existing legal obligations, regardless of whether the company was 
formed before or after those obligations arose. Yet the debate has also clarified when 
the veil will not be lifted. The position in Adams has been confirmed: the veil should not 
be lifted simply to achieve ―justice‖; it is submitted that the decision in Conway v Ratiu 
(examined in chapter 4.6.3) cannot yet be seen as an authoritative challenge to that 
proposition. Meanwhile, Bromilow‘s arguments for a new ―Creasey extension‖ have not 
been accepted: the veil will not be lifted merely to penalise or remedy a breach of 
directors‘ duties, where no dishonest motives are present, however pragmatic or fair 
such a step might seem. In conclusion, the debate about Creasey has confirmed that 
there are, after all, limitations on when the courts will deviate from the Salomon 
principle. Whilst recent Court of Appeal decisions have hinted at a ―rehabilitation‖ of the 
principles of DHN and Re a Company,99 there have been no such hints in relation to 
Creasey. We are now in a position to assess the overall impact of these three cases.  
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 [2011] EWHC 2339 
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 1 May 2012 
99
 See chapters 3.10 and 4.6 respectively.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
6.1 The legacy of DHN, Re a Company and Creasey: how far is Salomon v 
Salomon & Co Ltd still “the unyielding rock”? 
 
If this study had been written following the decision in Adams v Cape Industries plc, it 
would have been relatively easy to answer the above question. It seemed clear as to 
when the courts would or would not lift the veil. The ―single economic unit‖ argument 
employed in DHN had all but disintegrated. The court had also emphatically rejected the 
notion, advanced in Re a Company, that the veil should be lifted where this was 
‗necessary to achieve justice‘. Nor should the veil be lifted on moral grounds simply 
because of Salomon‟s implications for a company‘s tort creditors. It seemed that the 
court would only lift the veil where the company was being used as a ―façade‖ or ―sham‖ 
to conceal improprieties. The only ―grey area‖ was precisely when a ―façade‖, ―sham‖ or 
―fraud‖ situation would arise, since the court had not attempted ‗a comprehensive 
definition of those principles.‘1 
 
If this study had been written after Adams but before 2007, it would still have been 
relatively easy (perhaps even easier) to answer the question. The Court of Appeal‘s 
decision in Ord v Belhaven Pubs Ltd had cleared up the confusion created by the 
decision in Creasey. The ―single economic unit‖ argument and the ―justice‖ argument 
still remained dead in the water. Arguments in favour of a new ―Creasey extension‖ had 
not gained currency: the veil would not be lifted to penalise or remedy a breach of 
directors‘ duties, where no dishonest motives were present, regardless of how 
pragmatic or fair this might be. Moreover, the decision in Trustor had, perhaps for the 
first time, clarified when the ―fraud‖ situation would arise – namely, when the corporate 
structure was dishonestly used to evade existing legal obligations, regardless of 
whether the company had been formed before or after those obligations arose. 
Otherwise, as Slade LJ had stated in Adams, ‗save in cases which turn[ed] on the 
wording of particular statutes or contracts, the court [was] not free to disregard the 
                                                          
1
 Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433, 543 
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principle of Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1897] A.C. 22 merely because it 
consider[ed] that justice so require[d].‘ In short, Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd did 
indeed remain ―the unyielding rock‖.  
 
Since 2007, however, the picture has become less clear. The Court of Appeal‘s decision 
in Beckett explicitly approved of the ―single economic unit‖ argument,2 whilst Adelson3 
likewise hinted at a rehabilitation of this argument. Meanwhile, Conway v Ratiu 
suggests that the current Court of Appeal favours, as Auld LJ put it, ‗draw[ing] back the 
corporate veil to do justice when common-sense and reality demand it.‘4 Yet this new 
flexibility has yet to filter down to the lower courts, as seen by the decisions in Gripple5, 
Linsen6 and Ben Hashem7. Perhaps the most definitive statement that can be made is 
that for first-instance judges, Salomon does indeed remain ‗the unyielding rock‘; but 
their colleagues in the Court of Appeal seem eager – at least in some instances - for the 
opportunity to assail it. It is disappointing that the recent Court of Appeal decision in 
Cape plc v Chandler has done little to clear up the confusion.8  
 
6.2 The call for certainty and reform 
As so often in the past, therefore, it is currently unclear as to when the courts will or will 
not deviate from the Salomon principle. In 2011, David Milman commented that ‗the 
theme of unpredictability looms large when we look at veil-lifting… There is a real need 
for guidance from the Supreme Court.‘9 These sentiments echo those of Kahn-Freund 
in 1944,10 Wedderburn in 196011 and 1984,12 Powles in 197713 and Muchlinski in 
                                                          
2
 See chapter 3.10.1 
3
 See chapter 3.10.2 
4
 Conway v Ratiu [2006] All ER 571 [75]. See chapter 4.6.3. 
5
 See chapter 3.10.3 
6
 See chapter 3.10.3 
7
 See chapter 4.6.4 
8
 See chapter 3.10.4 
9
 D Milman, ‗Entity status issues in the UK law of business organisations and related entities: recurrent 
uncertainty‘ (2011) 306 Co LN 1, 4 
10
 See chapter 2.3 
11
 See chapter 2.3  
12
 See chapter 3.8.1 
13
 See chapter 3.6.1 
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2002.14 If Adams had reached the House of Lords, such guidance might have 
emanated. Yet this did not happen, and no comparable case has reached the House of 
Lords or the Supreme Court since.  
 
Nor has Parliament taken the opportunity to issue such guidance. The Company Law 
Reform Steering Group (―CLRSG‖), set up in 1998, recognised the problems caused by 
the Salomon principle to tort creditors within the context of corporate groups in 
particular:  
There is a strong case for allowing companies, like individuals, to take advantage 
of the principle of limited liability in relation to creditors by forming subsidiaries, the 
creditor being able to exact a price for the credit to reflect the level of risk. But the 
arguments are less strong in relation to tort liability, particularly in relation to parent 
companies, where uncompensated externalisation of risk is possible by the use of 
a thinly capitalised subsidiary protecting the main business assets, even though a 
subsidiary will be closely held, permitting tight management of risks to third parties 
by the parent…15  
 
Nevertheless, the CLRSG, mirroring the conservative approach of the Court of Appeal 
in Adams, declined to recommend any reforms in this area: 
However, there are circumstances in which we regard it as entirely proper for a 
holding company to segregate an activity in a subsidiary with the risks of liability, 
including tortious or delictual liability, in mind. Many torts are closely linked with 
contractual liabilities, for example liability for professional services and 
misrepresentation and product liability. We are also not aware of any jurisdiction 
providing for parent companies to be automatically liable for the torts or delicts of 
their subsidiaries. Defining the circumstances in which use of limited liability in this 
way should be regarded as abusive would be difficult. Nor are we aware of cases 
where parent companies have engaged in such abuse. The under-capitalisation of 
subsidiaries, and their operation in a way which creates undue risks of insolvency, 
are matters best dealt with by insolvency law. We do not therefore propose any 
reforms in this regard.16 
 
                                                          
14
 See chapter 3.9.3 
15
 Company Law Reform Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Completing 
the Structure (Consultation Document, 2000) 198 
16
 ibid, 198-199 (emphasis added) 
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The CSLRG‘s Final Report17 was silent on the matter, much to the disappointment of 
Muchlinski18 and also of Dignam and Lowry.19 
 
It has therefore fallen to academics to make proposals for reform. As noted in chapter 
2.3, Wedderburn in 1960 called for a non-exhaustive statutory list of situations in which 
the court might lift the veil.20 His hope that ‗[t]he next Companies Act [w]ould be the 
foundation-stone of a new structure of rules allowing for the penetration of the corporate 
veil‘21 proved to be in vain.  
 
More recently, Marc Moore has made perhaps the most extensive suggestion for 
reform. Arguing that the ―sham‖ argument is ‗the only general basis upon which a court 
will be justified in disregarding a company‘s separate legal personality,‘22 Moore 
nevertheless points out that the classic ―sham‖ cases of Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne 
and Jones v Lipman do not actually refer to Salomon itself. He therefore describes the 
―sham‖ exception to the Salomon principle as ‗the product of a piecemeal and 
doctrinally tenuous process of judicial reasoning.‘23 He goes on to develop a ‗genuine 
ultimate purpose‘ rule,24 adherence to which would determine whether or not the veil 
should be lifted in any given case. According to this rule, the veil would not be lifted 
‗merely on the ground that the formation of [a] company was motivated by the desire of 
its incorporator to shield themselves from personal liability that they would or might 
otherwise find themselves under.‘25 It would, however, be lifted where the desire to 
avoid personal liability, rather than any ‗genuine end or goal of its incorporator‘s 
business,‘26 was the ‗ultimate‟27 reason for incorporation.  
                                                          
17
 Company Law Reform Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Final 
Report (2001) 
18
 See chapter 3.9.3 
19
 Alan Dignam & John Lowry, Company Law (6th edn, OUP 2010) 47 
20
 KW Wedderburn, ‗A Corporations Ombudsman?‘ (1960) 23 MLR 663, 666 
21
 ibid, 667 
22
 Marc Moore, ‗‖A temple built on faulty foundations‖: piercing the corporate veil and the legacy of 
Salomon v Salomon‘ [2006] JBL 180, 184 (emphasis in original) 
23
 ibid 196 (as noted in chapter 2.2.3 above) 
24
 ibid 198f. 
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 ibid 200 
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 ibid 200 
27
 ibid 200 (emphasis in original)  
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On this basis, Moore argues that the Salomon decision was correct since, ‗as Lord 
Macnaghten expressly acknowledged… the ultimate motivation behind the incorporation 
of A. Salomon & Co. was the desire of Mr Salomon to increase the size of his business 
and facilitate the future involvement in it of his family members,‘28 whereas ‗the limitation 
of his personal liability for business debts was shown on the facts to be only a 
preliminary motivation behind Mr Salomon‘s decision to incorporate his business.‘29 By 
contrast, Moore contends that the veil should have been lifted in Adams, on the grounds 
that ‗the incorporation of NAAC was clearly, on the facts, motivated primarily (if not 
wholly) by the desire of Cape Industries to protect itself from potential personal 
liability.‘30 As Moore puts it:  
One can, therefore, distinguish the facts of Salomon from those of Adams on the 
ground that, in Salomon, the relevant company's incorporation was motivated 
ultimately by factors other than the limitation of the defendant's potential liabilities, 
so that the defendant company could be said to be serving a genuine end or goal 
of its incorporator's business. In Adams, on the other hand, the relevant company's 
incorporation was motivated ultimately by nothing more admirable or sophisticated 
than the mere desire of its incorporator to limit their personal liability. Accordingly, 
whilst the relevant subsidiary in Adams, NAAC, was not a ―fraud or sham‖ within 
the meaning established in Gilford, it was neither actively contributing towards the 
―head and brains‖ of the overall business enterprise... Rather, NAAC (unlike A. 
Salomon & Co.) was ultimately subservient to the specific desire of its incorporator 
to mitigate the avenues of legal reproach available to the potential victims of Cape 
Industries' activities. Accordingly, Cape Industries would fail to satisfy a court that 
NAAC existed to promote a ―genuine ultimate purpose‖ of its business, thereby 
justifying a court in disregarding the formally separate legal personality of NAAC 
relative to Cape.31 
 
If the veil had been lifted on this basis in Adams, this would have given some relief to 
tort creditors. This factor appears, at least partly, to inform Moore‘s thinking.32 
 
Applying this ‗genuine ultimate purpose‘ test, Moore suggests that the Court of Appeal 
was correct to refuse to lift the veil in Ord v Belhaven Pubs. He argues that the 
subsidiary to which assets had been transferred as part of the restructuring did serve a 
                                                          
28
 ibid 200, referring to Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22, 48 (MacNaghten LJ); cf chapter 1.2 
29
 ibid 200 
30
 ibid 200 (emphasis added) 
31
 ibid 201-202 (emphasis in original)  
32
 Marc Moore, unpublished email to the writer, 30 April 2012 (referenced with permission) 
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‗genuine ultimate purpose‘: ‗Belhaven was clearly actively involved in the carrying on of 
the business of the general enterprise of which it was part, thereby justifying a court in 
maintaining its autonomous legal existence.‘33 By contrast, he argues that in Creasey, 
Breachwood Motors Ltd served no ‗genuine ultimate purpose‘ and therefore Richard 
Southwell QC‘s decision to lift the veil was justifiable, even it was not expressed in such 
terms:  
[T]he established facts of Creasey suggest that the defendant company, 
Breachwood Motors, did not exist to promote any identifiable strategy or goal of 
the motor business of which it was part. Rather, the motor business was carried on 
wholly by Welwyn Motors, the other company within the arrangement. The only 
―real‖ role that Breachwood fulfilled within the business was that of owning the 
premises from which Welwyn carried on the business. However, given that both 
Breachwood and Welwyn were under the ownership and control of the same two 
traders (Mr Ford and Mr Seaman), then there would seem to be no valid reason as 
to why Breachwood, and not Welwyn, should have owned the premises of the 
latter's business. Breachwood's independent legal existence therefore cannot be 
justified in accordance with any identifiable strategy or goal of the motor business, 
other than, of course, the a priori opportunism of its founders, Mr Ford and Mr 
Seaman, in foresight of Welwyn's potential legal liability. Consequently… 
[Breachwood Motors‘] autonomous legal existence could not have been justified by 
reference to any genuine, independent purpose of the business enterprise of 
which it was part. The Court of Appeal (sic) was, accordingly, correct in 
disregarding the formally separate personality of Breachwood Motors 
in Creasey, albeit for reasons other than the one forwarded here.34 
 
Moore appears to overlook the fact that Breachwood Motors operated similar motor 
businesses elsewhere.35 Nevertheless, it is difficult to resist his contention that there 
was no valid business reason for Breachwood Motors to own the premises from which 
Welwyn operated. For Moore, this ‗genuine ultimate purpose rule‘ would constitute ‗a 
concrete, workable and doctrinally legitimate test for determining the legality of 
opportunist usages of the corporate veil,‘36 and, by extension, a clear guide as to when 
the veil should or should not be lifted on the grounds of ―sham.‖ 
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 Moore (n 22) 200 
34
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 Creasey v Breachwood Motors Ltd [1992] BCC 638 (QBD) (headnote) 
36
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Moore‘s proposed rule appears to ―work‖ in relation to some of the other major ―sham‖ 
cases. In Gilford, as Moore himself observes, the company was not involved in the 
‗carrying on‘ of Mr Horne‘s business, but was instead ‗being carried on‘ by Horne for his 
own (nefarious) purposes ‗making it an object being deployed in, rather than itself 
deploying, the affairs of Mr Horne‘s business‘.37 The same could clearly be said of the 
company in Jones v Lipman. It is unclear, however, whether the rule as formulated by 
Moore would ―work‖ in situations such as those in the following scenarios.  
 
Scenario 1: an English-based plc sets up a subsidiary to operate a factory in a different 
jurisdiction. The subsidiary is registered in that jurisdiction, partly to take advantage of 
that jurisdiction‘s tax regime. Its corporate form therefore serves, in Moore‘s terms, a 
‗genuine ultimate purpose.‘ Years later, the factory explodes, injuring thousands, who 
become tort creditors of the subsidiary. The parent company has had little involvement 
in the business of the subsidiary, and therefore has no ―duty of care‖ to the subsidiary‘s 
creditors in tort (pace Chandler). It has, however, allowed the subsidiary to become 
under-capitalised, such that it cannot meet all of the tort claims. Would Moore‘s 
argument allow the courts (contra Adams) to lift the veil between the parent company 
and its subsidiary? One suspects that his concerns for the subsidiary‘s tort creditors 
would lead him to say ―Yes‖, but it is unclear whether his ‗genuine ultimate purpose‘ rule 
would necessarily produce the same outcome.  
 
Scenario 2: a company is set up by an individual in order to promote a legitimate 
business. The company form is chosen so that a floating charge can be created in order 
to secure borrowing. The corporate form therefore again serves a ‗genuine ultimate 
purpose.‘ Several years later, the individual uses the company‘s bank account to 
launder money. Criminal proceedings commence against the individual. An application 
is made to join the company in the proceedings, which, if successful, have the effect of 
lifting the veil. In such a situation, the company, as formed, would serve a ‗genuine 
ultimate purpose.‘ Yet the court would surely lift the veil in such circumstances. As seen 
in chapter 5, cases such as Trustor have confirmed that the veil will be pierced 
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whenever the company is used as a façade to evade legal obligations, regardless of 
whether the company was formed before or after those legal obligations arose.  
 
It is submitted that Moore‘s argument needs to be nuanced slightly, in order to take 
such circumstances into account.  
 
6.3 Conclusions 
Moore‘s proposed rule, if adopted, would nevertheless provide a measure of certainty 
as to when the veil might be lifted on the ―sham‖ ground, particularly if nuanced along 
the lines suggested above. His formulation is therefore to be commended. As noted in 
chapter 2.2.3, his arguments have, surprisingly, received little critical attention.38 The 
currently unclear judicial position may stimulate academics to consider his proposals 
afresh.  
 
What Moore does not set out to do is to give guidance on whether the veil should ever 
be lifted on the grounds of the ―single economic unit‖ argument or on the grounds of 
―justice‖. This study has sought to assess whether Salomon remains the ―unyielding 
rock‖ in 2012, in the light of DHN, Re a Company and Creasey. Prior to 2007, the 
decisions in Adams, Ord v Belhaven and Trustor had generated a clear answer to the 
question: Salomon did indeed remain the unyielding rock. Since then, the decisions of 
the Court of Appeal in Beckett, Adelson, Conway and Chandler have made the picture 
less clear. It is still to be hoped, perhaps vainly, that clear judicial or statutory guidance 
on when the courts will lift the veil will yet emerge.  
  
                                                          
38
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